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NOTES
The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer
and Environmental Protection*
[The Attorney General] is not a counsel giving advice to the
government as his client, but a public officer, acting judicially, under
all the solemn responsibilities of conscience and of lega.l obligation.t

The increasing seriousness of consumer and environmental problems1 calls for action by the state governments.2 Any attempt on the
part of a state to protect the public interest in these areas should
be centered in the office of the state's attorney general. The attorney
general's expertise in law enforcement and his position as the chief
law enforcement officer of the state should allow him to combat
consumer and environmental problems most effectively.
In an effort to clarify the role of the attorney general as public
representative, this Note will examine the functioning of the office
of the Michigan attorney general.3 After an analysis of the nature
• The author would like to thank the Michigan Attorney General, Frank J. Kelley,
and his office for their help in the compilation of data for this Note. The assistance of
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Ronald J. Styka; Assistant Attorneys General Edwin
M. Bladen, Roderick S. Coy, Stewart H. Freeman, and Gay S. Hardy; and Complaint
Examiner Fem Wright is especially appreciated.
C. CUSHING, A REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUGGESTING MODIFICATIONS IN
nm MANNER OF CONDUCTING nm LEGAL BUSINESS OF nm Govm.'IIIIENT, H.R. Ex. Doc.
No. 95 and S. Ex. Doc. No. 55, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1854).
I. For discussions of the scope of consumer problems, sec D. CAPLOVITZ, TnE POOR
PAY MORE (1963); W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF TIIE MARKETPLACE
(1968); P. SCHRAG, COUNSEL FOR TilE DECEIVED: CASE STUDIES IN CONSUMER FRAUD (1972);
Comment, RejJresentation of the Public Interest in Michigan Utility Rate Proceedings,
70 M1etr. L. REv. 1367 (1972); Comment, Consumer Protection in Michigan: Current
Methods and Some Proposals for Reform, 68 MICH. L. REv. 926 (1970). For discussions
of the scope of environmental problems, see SOCIETY AND ENVIRONMENT: TIIE COMING
CoLLtstoN (R. Campbell &: J. Wade ed. 1972); THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK (G, Debell
ed. 1973); THE POLLUTION READER (A. DEVOS et al. ed. 1968); THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
(H. Helfrich ed. 1970).
2. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders concluded that unfair consumer practices and poor environmental conditions were significant contributory causes
of the urban riots of the late 1960's. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CIVIL DISORDERS 138-41 (1968).
3. For discussion of roles played by attorneys general in other states, sec Baxley,
The State's Attorney, 25 ALA. L. REv. 19 (1972); Burch, Maryland's "Action" Program
in Consumer Protection, 42 STATE Govr. 161 (1969); Christenson, The State Attorney
General, 1970 Wts. L. REv. 298; Mindell, The New York Bureau of Consumer

t

Frauds and Protection-A Review of Its Consumer Protection Activities, 11 N.Y. L.F.
603 (1965); Morgan, The People's Advocate in the Marketplace-The Role of the North
Carolina Attorney General in the Field of Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REv. I (1969); O'Connell, Consumer Protection in the State of Washington,
39 STATE Govr. 230 (1966); Richardson, The Office of the Attorney General: Continuity
and Change, 53 MASS. L.Q. 5 (1968); Saxbe, The Role of the Government in Consumer
Protection: The Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Office of the Ohio Attorney
General, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 897 (1968); Comment, The Role of California's Attorney
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and extent of the attorney general's powers and of his current utilization of those powers, several proposals to increase his effectiveness
will be discussed.

I. POWERS OF THE OFFICE OF' ATTORNEY GENERAL4
In England the role of attorney general developed gradually
from a position as the king's lawyer to that of the government's
chief law enforcement officer. As chief law enforcement officer, the
attorney general represented the government's interests in court
and advised the different governmental departments on legal matters. 5 In addition, he had the duty and power to represent the interests of the public. 6 The offices of the colonial attorneys general were
patterned after their English counterpart.7 The American Revolution brought few changes, as the new state attorneys general continued to act as the chief law enforcement officers of their respective
General and District Attorneys in Protecting the Consumer, 4 U. CAL. DAVIS L. R.Ev. 35
(1971); Comment, The Attorney General as Consumer Advocate: City of York v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1170 (1973). See also J.
Sebert, Consumer Protection in the States and Local Communities, in STAFF STUDIES
PREPARED FOR. THE NATIONAL lNSTlTUTE FOR. CONSUMER. JUSTICE ON 1. STATE AND FEDER.AL
REGULATORY AGENCIES, 2. MISCELLANEOUS REDRESS MECHANISMS 1-113 (1973); Note,
Consumer Protection by the State Attorneys General: A Time for Renewal, 49 NoTR.E
DAME LAw. 410 (1973); Tannenbaum, In Many States, Office of Attorney General Grows
More Powerful, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1972, at 1, col. 1 (eastern ed.).
4. See generally Bellot, The Origin of the Attorney-General, 25 LAW Q. REv. 400
(1909); Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney General in
England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304 (1958); Holdsworth, The
Early History of the Attorney General and Solicitor General, 13 ILL. L. R.Ev. 602 (1919).
During the Middle Ages in England, the king was represented by many different
serjeants and counselors, each of whom represented the Crown only with respect to
certain matters, only in certain courts, or only in specific geographic areas. 6 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-60 (2d ed. 1937); Cooley, supra, at 306. The office
of the attorney general came into formal existence in 1472 when William Husee was
appointed attorney general with the power to appoint deputies to act for him in courts
of record throughout the realm. Bellot, supra, at 410. The office evolved slowly, acquiring a wide variety of powers as it grew. By the sixteenth century, th'e attorney general
had assumed the role of the chief representative of the state in the courts. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 461.
5. 6
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 457-58, 460-61.
6. l HALSBUR.Y, THE LAws OF ENGLAND 9, 11 6 (1907) ("Where the right infringed is
a public right, and where the grievance is a grievance to the whole community equally,
••• the appropriate remedy is by proceedings of a public nature, i.e., indictment or an
action by the Attorney-General, as the guardian of the public's rights.'); 2 RULING CAsE
LAW, Attorney General § 4, at 915-16 (1914) ("[IJt is generally held that, in exercise of
his common law powers, an attorney-general may ••• intervene in all suits or proceedings which are of concern to the general public.'). See also Howard v. Cook, 59 Idaho
391, 397, 83 P .2d 208, 211 (1938); Capitol Stages, Inc. v. State ex rel. Hewitt, l!i7 Miss.
576, 591, 128 759, 763 (1930).
'l. See generally 0. HAMMONDS, THE ATIOR.NEY GENERAL IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES
(Anglo-American Legal History Series, ser. I, no. 2, 1939); Cooley, supra note 4, at
309-12. Despite the differences among the types of colonial governments, the powers and
£unctions of the colonial attorneys general were very similar throughout the colonies.

w.

s.
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states with the same common law powers and duties that they had
possessed before the Revolution. 8
The office of the attorney general in the territory of Michigan
was created in 1807.9 The powers and duties given to the attorney
general were to prosecute and defend all suits, both civil and criminal, for and against the United States or the territory, and to perform all official duties required by the legislature, the governor,
and the courts. Under the territorial government, the common law
prevailed except as changed by statute,10 and the attorney general
presumably retained his common law powers.11 When Michigan
became a state in 1837, its new constitution continued the office12
and provided that its powers and duties were to be "prescribed by
law."13 Subsequent enabling legislation passed in 1838 expanded
the powers and duties of the office beyond those it had possessed
under the earlier territorial statutes.14 By 1919, the attorney general
8. Cooley, supra note 4, at 311-12. In most of the new states, the constitutions pro•
vided for the office of the attorney general. The attorney general was to be appointed
by the governor, the legislature, or both. See, e.g., DEL, CONST. art. 3, § 8, art. 8, §§ 1, 5
(1792); N.J. CoNST, art. XII (1776),
9. Act of Jan. 29, 1807, No. 12, 4 Mich. Terr. Laws 15 (Supp, 1884).
IO. May v. Rumney, 1 Mich. I, 3-4 (1847); In re Sanderson, 289 Mich. 165, 174-75,
286 N.W. 198, 201-02 (1939).
II. The Michigan courts have held that the common law remains in full force
except as specifically restricted by constitution or statute. Bugbee v. Fowle, 277 Mich,
485, 492, 269 N.W. 570, 572 (1936); Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184, 188-89 (Mich. 1845),
They have also stated specifically that the attorney general retains his common law
powers. Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 450-51, 185 N.W. 877, 880 (1921); People
v. Karalla, 35 Mich. App. 541, 544, 192 N.W.2d 676, 678, motion for leave to
appeal denied, 386 Mich. 765 (1971); [1941-1942] MICH, AITY. GEN. BIENNIAL
REP. 309, 310. See also People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396, 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868)
("As the powers of the attorney-general, were not conferred by statute, a grant
by statute of the same or other powers, would not operate to deprive him of those
belonging to the office at common law, unless the statute, either expressly, or by reason•
able intendment, forbade the exercise of powers not thus expressly conferred."). See
generally NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATIORNEYS GENERAL, COMllllITEE ON TIIE OFFICE OF
ATIORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON nm OFFICE OF AnoRNEY GENERAL 32-61 (1971~ [herein•
after OFFICE OF AnoRNEY GENERAL]; Shepperd, Common Law Powers and Duties of the
Attorney General, 7 BAYLOR L. REv. I (1955); Note, Attorney General-Common Law
Powers Over Criminal Prosecutions and Civil Litigation of the State, 16 N.C. L. REv.
282 (1938).
12. MICH. CoNST. art. 7, § 3 (1835). The new attorney general was to be appointed by
the governor with the consent of the state senate for a tenn of two years. MICH. CONST,
art. 7, § 3 (1835).
13. MICH. CoNST. art. 7, § 3 (1835). In 1836, the legislature declared that the attorney
general was to have the same powers and duties that he had had under the territorial
government. Act of March 28, 1836, § I, [1835-1836] Mich. Laws 43.
14. The powers and duties vested in the attorney general by that act included the
power to appear for the state before the Michigan supreme court, or any other court,
when requested to do so by the governor or the legislature in a case where the state was
a party or otherwise interested, MICH, REv. STAT, pt. first, tit. III, ch. I, § 20 (1838); the
duty to consult with and advise the local prosecuting attorneys, 1\IIcn. REV, STAT, pt.
first, tit. III, ch. I, § 21 (1838); the duty to submit an annual report to the legislature,
M1cH. REv. STAT, pt. first, tit. III, ch. I, § 21 (1838); the power to issue advisory

April 1974]

Notes

1033

was empowered to intervene in any judicial action in order to protect the rights or interests of the state or the people of the state.16
Since the attorney general's role in any governmental system is
dependent upon the powers and authority vested in his office, a
detailed review of his powers must precede any discussion of how
he can better protect the public in consumer and environmental
areas.

A. General Powers of the Michigan Attorney General
As the state's chief law enforcement officer, the Michigan attorney general has substantial general powers to deal with all consumer
and environmental problems. These include the powers to represent all state boards and agencies, to initiate cases to protect the
public interest, and to intervene in litigation where it is necessary
to protect the public interest.
The first major way in which the attorney general can protect
the public interest is through his power to represent all state boards
and agencies.16 This power is vested exclusively in the office of the
attorney general, and no state agency or official may hire outside
counsel to represent its or his interests.17 So long as the state boards
and agencies are representing the public interest, the effect of the
attorney general's representation of them is to further the public
interest.
The attorney general, however, has been forced to recognize two
limitations on this power. First, the lack of adequate resources-in
particular, the lack of funds needed to employ additional assistant
attorneys general and investigators-has occasionally led the attorney
general to allow state agencies to hire outside counsel. The attorney
general considers this practice illegal18 and rarely perm~ts it. At the
opinions whenever requested to do so by a house of the legislature or any state office,
1M1cH. REv. STAT. pt. first, tit. III, ch. I, § 23 (1838); and the duty to recommend
changes in the criminal jurisprudence system of the state to the legislature. MICH. REv.
STAT, pt. first, tit. III, ch. I, § 22 (1838).
15. Act of May 12, 1919, No. 232, § I, [1919] Mich. Pub. Acts 418.
MICH. CoMP, LAws ANN. § 14.29 (1967). While the statute speaks only of repre-

rn:

sentation for the elected state officials, it has always been assumed that it includes all
state agencies. See note 17 infra. ,
17, See Act of Aug. 26, 1973, No. 130, § 23, [1973] Mich. Pub. & Loe. Acts-: "All
legal services, including representation before courts and administrative agencies
rendering legal opinions and providing legal advice to any state department or agency,
shall be performed by the attorney general and no state agency shall employ or enter
into a contract with any other person for such services." The Michigan courts and the
attorney general bad earlier reached the same result. See Jennings v. State Veterinary
Bd., 156 Mich. 417, 120 N.W. 785 (1909); [1926-1928] MICH. A'ITY. GEN. BIENNIAL
REP. 281.
18. See [1926-1928] MICH. ATIY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 281, 282-83 (1927):

We have had in this state at different times, specific statutes which authorized
departments created for special purposes, to employ an attorney; but these statutes

1034

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:1030

present time no outside counsel are employed by any state agency,
with the exception of the Civil Service Commission.19
A second, and more serious, limitation arises from conflict-of•
interests problems. For example, since the assistant attorneys general are civil service employees,20 the attorney general, despite his
opinion that outside counsel are hired illegally, allows the Civil
Service Commission to hire outside attorneys to represent it, in order
to avoid the appearance of conflict.21 Another kind of conflict of
interests occurs when the attorney general's office is called upon to
represent nvo state agencies on opposite sides of a controversy. This
problem is easily handled if each agency is represented by a separate division of the office, for the nvo divisions can simply work
independently in presenting each agency's case. If the two agencies
are normally represented by the same division, two solutions are
possible. First, the attorney general may assign each agency's case
to a different assistant attorney general within the division, with
instructions that they work independently. This, however, does little
to remove the appearance of a conflict. Alternatively, the attorney
general may assign the representation of one of the agencies to the
Special Litigation Division, while the other agency is represented
by the regular division for that agency.22
A conflict-of-interests problem may also arise when the attorney
general perceives that the public interest is on one side of a controversy and a state agency is on the other. This situation can be
handled in several ways. One solution, again, is to have the Special
have been regarded by this department as unconstitutional, and the authority has
been permitted and to be exercised [sic) by such attorneys for such departments,
only because this department has not had an appropriation sufficient to enable it to
employ the necessary assistants to take charge of all the work.
The attorney general opposes the hiring of such outside counsel because it limits ltls
power to influence and affect administrative policy within the state.
19. Interview with Ronald J. Styka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Michigan
Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, August 27, 1973 [hereinafter Styka
Interview].
20. DeMaggio v. Attorney General, 300 Mich. 251, 261, 1 N.W.2d 530, 533 (1942),
21. Styka Interview, supra note 19. The attorney general's office is currently seeking
to terminate this practice. Telephone interview with Ronald J. Styka, Assistant Deputy
Attorney General, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, May 17, 1974.
22. Interview with Roderick S. Coy, Assistant Attorney General, Special Litigation
Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, August 27, 1973
[hereinafter Coy Interview]. Use of the Special Litigation Division is limited since the
division has only two assistant attorneys general assigned to it and has many other
responsibilities. See text accompanying notes 180-86 infra. One recent example of a
conflict of interests was Water Resources Commn. v. Chippewa County, No. 12!i5
(Chippewa County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Aug. 31, 1973), where the defendant joined the
State Highway Department as a third-party defendant. This meant that the attorney
general's office was counsel for both the plaintiff, as the legal representative of tlte
Water Resources Commission, and the defendant, as the representative for the Highway
Department. Conflict-of.interests problems were avoided by having a separate division
within the office represent each state agency.
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Litigation Division represent the public interest by instituting an
action against the agency or intervening on the side of a private
party in litigation against the agency.23 AB a second alternative, the
attorney general may attempt to persuade the agency to alter its
position. If the agency will not change its stance, the attorney general may refuse to represent it with respect to that issue.24 Finally,
the attorney general may, if he feels that conflict cannot be properly
handled by the procedures discussed above, permit the agency to
secure outside counsel at its own expense; as suggested above, this
procedure is very rarely used.25
A second major source of the attorney general's power to protect the public interest is his statutory power to act, whenever necessary, to protect the rights and interests of the people of the state.26
The common law similarly empowers him to act whenever necessary
to protect the public interest.27 Both the statutory and common
law powers, however, are limited in that they do not allow the attorney general to recover damages on behalf of individual state citizens.
Recently, attempts have been made to overcome this limitation
by use of the common law doctrine of parens patriae, under which
the attorney general retains the power to act for the protection of
lunatics, infants, and others who are unable to protect themselves.28
In the past courts have allowed attorneys general to use this doctrine
to secure injunctive or declaratory relief,29 but they have not been
willing to extend the power to allow the attorney general to recover
damages on behalf of individual citizens.30 It could be argued, however, that the doctrine should be expanded to include cases of corporate consumer fraud and pollution because the public, or at least
23. See note 22 supra for limitations on the use of the Special Litigation Division.
But see Arizona State Land Dept. v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960), where
the court, in a state that does not recognize the common law powers of the attorney
general, refused to allow the attorney general to bring an action on behalf of the public
to enjoin the proposed sale of public lands by a state agency. See Casenote, 2 ARIZ. L.
REV. 293 (1960),
24. Styka Interview, supra note 19. See text accompanying notes 289-94 infra.
25. Styka Interview, supra note 19.
26, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN, §§ 14.28, .101 (1967).
27. See note 6 supra.
28. See 3 w. BLACKSTONE, COMIIIBNTARIES •47, •426-27.
29. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 5!'>3 (1923); Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208 (1901). The attorney general can act to protect such interests as the environment and the general economy of the state under the doctrine. Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co,, 405 U.S. 251, 258-60 (1972). The state may "sue as parens patriae to prevent or
repair harm to its 'quasi-sovereign' interests." 405 U.S. at 258.
30, "[T]he state's parens patriae claim cannot be a disguised attempt to recover
damages on behalf of the state's individual citizen-claimants." Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251,258 (1972). The Court seemed to be particularly concerned that allowance of the action might lead to double recoveries and to a substitute for class-action
procedures. See 405 U.S. at 263-64, 266.
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large portions of it, is incapable of protecting itself when faced with
those problems.
While the Michigan courts have been silent on this question,
a recent federal court decision has probably reduced the likelihood
of such an expansion. In California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 31 the state
of California, as parens patriae, brought an action to recover treble
damages on behalf of its citizens for injuries alleged to have been
suffered as a result of a conspiracy to fix and maintain prices in
violation of the Sherman Act.32 The court recognized that the royal
prerogative function of parens patriae had passed to the states but
could find no judicial recognition for using the doctrine "as a basis
for recovery of money damages for injuries suffered by individuals.''33
The court also rejected the state's contention that "the practical
inability of an injured citizen to bring an individual suit in his
own "behalf creates a ... disability [comparable to that suffered by
lunatics and infants] and warrants the establishment of a state pre•
rogative to act for his protection." 34 The court stated that, "if the
state is to be empowered to act in the fashion here sought . . . that
authority must come not through judicial improvisation but hy
legislation and rule making."35 Nonetheless, this possibility remains
open to a court that is willing to use its traditional power to define
and control the common law.
31. 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). See also In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf. Hawaii, v,
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1•7 (1970). For a discussion of the value of using parens patriae in
these areas, see Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the
Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U. L. REv. 193 (1970); Note, State Protection of Its Economy
and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 CoLUM. J. L. & Soc. PRon. 411
(1970).
33. 474 F.2d at 775.
.,_
34. 474 F.2d at 776. See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 265 (1972):
"We note in passing the State's claim that the costs and other burdens of protracted
litigation render private citizens impotent to bring treble-damages actions, and thus
that denying Hawaii the right to sue for injury to her quasi-sovereign interests will
allow antitrust violations to go virtually unremedied. Private citizens are not as powerless, however, as the State suggests." The Court then noted the private citizens' right of
action to secure injunctive relief and damages for antitrust violations without regard to
the amount in controversy, the private class action, and the fact that the costs of litigation and attorneys' fees could be recovered in an antitrust suit for damages as proof
that the public is not impotent. The Supreme Court did not, however, mention several
other factors that might support a contrary finding. These include the recent limita•
tions placed on the federal class action by the Supreme Court and other federal courts,
see, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S., Dec. 17, 1973); the
small amount of each individual's damages, which would lead to no one citizen having
enough incentive to initiate prolonged litigation; the high costs of such litigation,
which, even though recoverable, will preclude action by the average citizen, who can
not afford to invest in a speculative venture of this type; and the higher deterent effect
that would exist if the claims of citizens were collected and prosecuted by the state,
See generally Malina & Blechman, supra note 32, at 213-17.
35. 474 F.2d at 777.
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A third major power that the attorney general can use to protect the public interest is the power to intervene in any proceeding
in which the public interest is threatened.36 Specifically, the attorney
general is "authorized and empowered to intervene in any action ...
in any court of the state whenever such intervention is necessary
in order to protect any right or interest of the state, or of the people
of the state.''37 This reaffirms his common law power to intervene in
an action in order to protect the public interest.38 The Michigan
courts have broadly construed the power so as to give the attorney
general a large measure of control over a case once he has intervened.89
They have concluded that the statute granting the power to
intervene also allows the attorney general to initiate an action to
protect the public interest, a power more useful than intervention
in an affirmative program of consumer and environmental protection. In In re Lewis' Estate,40 where the Attorney General petitioned
the probate court for reimbursement to the state from the estate
of a deceased mental patient for the costs of that patient's hospitalization in a state institution, the ~ourt held that "[w]hile a distinction may be drawn between intervening in a proceeding and instituting a suit there is a merger of purpose, by reason of public policy,
when the interests of the State call for action by its chief law officer
and there is no express legislative restriction to the contrary.''41
These three broad powers-to represent all state agencies and
to initiate or intervene in any judicial action where the public interest is involved-if properly used, give the attorney general the necessary standing to take action in any controversy involving consumer
and environmental problems.
B. Consumer Protection Powers of the Attorney General
The attorney general is vested with a wide range of consumer
protection powers. He has the authority to initiate criminal prosecutions for false advertising,42 for the obtaining of money under
36. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 14.101 (1967). A simlar power is granted to the
attorney general in MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 14.28 (1967). The Michigan courts have
held that this power is to be construed liberally. People v. O'Hara, 278 Mich. 281, 294,
270 N.W. 298, 303 (1936).
37. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 14.101 (1967).
38. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
39. E.g., Russell v. Peoples Wayne County Bank; 275 Mich. 415, 266 N.W. 401 (1936),
where the court granted the attorney general's motion to dismiss after the attorney
general had intervened in a bank liquidation proceeding.
40. 287 Mich. 179, 283 N.W. 21 (1938).
41. 287 Mich. at 184, 283 N.W. at 23. See People v. Karalla, 35 Mich. App. 541,
543-44, 192 N.W.2d 676, 677-78, motion for leave to appeal denied, 386 Mich. 765 (1971).
42. MICH. COMP, LAws ANN. § 750.33 (1968). While the statute does not specifically
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false pretenses,43 and for the violation of any of fifty-four state statutes regulating the sale and marketing of various products and
services.44
The attorney generid has an even broader range of powers under
which he can bring civil actions to protect the consumer. For
example, he can initiate actions for the violation of several regulatory statutes in the area of retail sales. Under the Home Improvement Finance Act45 he can bring an action to restrain or prevent
any violation of the provisions of the Act that regulate the terms
of home-improvement contracts.46 However, the Act only requires
the full disclosure of the terms of the contract and does not attempt
to regulate its substantive content,47 Most of the retail-sales statutes
are similarly designed to provide full disclosure and do not control
the substance of the contracts.48 While full-disclosure provisions
refer to the attorney general, his power of intervention would allow him to initiate
actions under this statute. See te.'Ct accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
43. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 650.218 (1968). While the statute does not specifically
refer to tbe attorney general, his power of intervention would allow him to initiate
actions under this statute. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
44. For as complete a compilation of these statutes as is presently available, sec
Michigan Consumers Council, Summary of Consumer Protection Legislation (May 1060).
Each of these statutes prohibits fraud or deception in the sale or marketing of n product
or service, For example, under the Comminuted Meat Law, MICH, Cor,w. LAws ANN,
§§ 289,581-.592 (1967), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 289.581, .582, .583a
(Supp. 1973), "[a]ny person or persons, firm or corporation, who shall publicly advertise
in or by newspapers, window banners, hand bills, bulletins, bulletin boards, ,:adio, tele•
vision or otherwise, falsely with reference to tbe composition of products within the
scope of this act manufactured, sold or offered for sale by him shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 289.589 (1967). While these statutes do not
specifically refer to the attorney general, his power of intervention would allow him to
initiate actions under these statutes. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra,
45. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.1101-.1431 (1967), as amended, MICH, CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 445.llll, .1207, ,1208 (Supp. 1973). Other statutes involving the regulation of
retail sales include: Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN,
§§ 492.101-.138 (1967), as amended, MICH, COMP, w.ws ANN, §§ 492,102, .106, .109, .113,
.122a, .136 (Supp. 1973); Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Contracts Act, MICH. COMP,
LAWS ANN. §§ 566.301-.302 (1967); Retail Installment Sales Act, MICH, COMP, LAws
ANN. §§ 445.851-.872 (1967), as amended, MICH, COMP, LAWS ANN, §§ 445,851a, .852, .865
(Supp. 1973); Home Solicitation Sales Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.111-.117
(Supp. 1973).
46. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 445.1422(1) (1967).
47. The Michigan statutes do attempt to provide some substantive protection for the
consumer by prohibiting the inclusion of certain clauses in retail-sales contracts. For
example, waiver-of-defenses clauses are prohibited in retail-installment-sales contracts,
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.864(£) (1967), and in tbe financing of motor vehicle sales,
MICH, COMP. LAws ANN, § 492.114(£) (1967). The rights of a holder in due course arc
limited by the Home Improvement Finance Act. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1207(1)
(1967). But see MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 492.114(£) (1967), which explicitly states that
the prohibited-clauses provisions of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act "shall in no
way impair or affect the rights and powers of a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument." See also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN, §§ 445.861, 445.1206, 492,114 (1967), See
generally Comment, 68 MmH. L. REv. 926, supra note I, at 936-46.
48. See statutes cited in note 45 supra.
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provide the consumer with the opportunity to compare credit terms
and to choose the contract with the most favorable terms, their
effectiveness can be blunted by high-pressure selling techniques or
by the consumer's lack of the knowledge necessary to make a proper
decision.49 Without regulation of the substantive content of retailsales contracts, the uneducated and the unwary are left without any
real protection.lio
Michigan does have a fair trade practices act,51 but its scope is
severely limited. It only prohibits the false representation of prices
in order to create the appearance of a reduction in price at a sale, 52
the sending of unsolicited merchandise to a consumer,53 and the
use of certain words when advertising goods for sale to the general
public.54 The state lacks a comprehensive act that would give the
attorney general the power to prevent any unfair or deceptive consumer practice. Such an act would provide the substantive protection for the consumer that the disclosure acts fail to provide.55
The present False Advertising Act56 does give the attorney additional general powers to protect the public. He may initiate an
action to enjoin the continuance of any violation of the Act.57
Before such action can be taken, however, the attorney general
must issue a cease-and-desist order that gives the respondent the
49. Comment, 68 MICH. L. REv. 926, supra note 1, at 934-36. See also Note, Legal
Knowledge of Michigan Citizens, 7l MICH. L. REv. 1463 (1973).
50. Comment, 68 MICH L. REv. 926, supra note I, at 935-36.
51. MICH. Co111P. LAws ANN. §§ 445.101-.109 (1967).
52. MICH. Colin>. LAws ANN. § 445.106(a) (1967).
53. MICH. Co11n>. LAws ANN. § 445.131 (Supp. 1973). The statute provides that the
"receipt of any ••• unsolicited goods shall be deemed for all purposes an' unconditional gift to the recipient." For a discussion of this provision, see Pooley, Contracts,
1970 Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 563, 580-83 (1971).
54. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.101, .103-.105 (1967). The legislature declared
that such words as "wholesale," "employee," "manufacturer," "miller," "wholesaler," and
"broker," are improper and misleading when used in connection with the advertisement
of products.
55. For comprehensive consumer protection acts of other states, see Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 407.010-.130 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to -220 (Supp. 1973); WASH.
REv. CODE §§ 19.86.010-.920 (Supp. 1972). For a listing, complete through September
1971, of states with legistlation that limits or restricts unfair or deceptive trade practices, see Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TULANE L. REv. 724,
757-60 (1972).
56. MICH. Co11n>. LAws ANN. §§ 445.801-.809 (1967), as amended, MICH. Co!lfi>. LAws
ANN, § 445.806a (Supp. 1973). The Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to make, publish, disseminate,
circulate or place before the public any advertisement which contains any statement or representation which is untrue, deceptive or misleading; or to advertise
the availability of goods, wares or merchandise so as to misrepresent or unreasonably overstate the available supply in relation to reasonably expectable public
demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity.
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN, § 445.801 (1967).
57. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.807(1) (1967).
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opportunity to halt his activities within forty-eight hours. 68 The
attorney general can also accept voluntary assurances of discontinuance in lieu of an action for an injunction.60 This power appears
to be sufficiently broad to allow him to prevent false and deceptive
advertising given sufficient resources for enforcement.
The protection afforded by the above statutes is augmented by
the attorney general's power to enjoin public nuisances. At common
law, public or common nuisances were "such inconvenient or
troublesome offenses as annoy the whole community in general,
and not merely some particular person." 00 The damages were required to be common to all members of the public. 61 The Michigan
courts have recognized that the attorney general is a proper party
to bring a public nuisance action. 62 However, in all such actions
the court will balance the equities in order to determine if the
facts of the cac;e require the issuance of an injunction. 63 Thus, the
effectiveness of the attorney general's use of this power depends on
the courts' willingness to grant injunctions.
A major expansion in the definition of a public nuisance, with
implications for consumer protection, occurred in Attorney General
ex rel. Optometry Board of Examiners v. Peterson. 64 The court
held that the violation of a valid statute passed for the protection
of the public health, safety, or welfare was a public nuisance. 06
The attorney general had brought the action to enjoin the de58. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.807(2) (1967).
59. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.809 (1967).
60. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •167.
61. 3 W,, BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 11 219·20,
62. Attorney General ex rel. Optometry Bd. of Examiners v. Peterson, 381 Mich,
445, 465•66, 164 N.W.2d 43, 53 (1969); Attorney General v. City of Howell, 231 Mich.
401, 402·03, 204 N.W. 91, 91 (1925); Attorney General ex rel. Township of Wyoming v.
City of Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 532-33, 141 N.W. 890, 900 (1913); Attorney
General ex rel. Muskegon Booming Co. v. Evart Booming Co., 34 Mich. 462, 472 (1876).
But see Attorney General v. Hane, 50 Mich. 447, 448, 15 N.W. 549, 549 (1883), where
the court refused to allow the attorney general to bring civil action to restrain the
maintenance of a mill dam that was alleged to be harmful to the public health. The
court held that such a case should be prosecuted by the public and submitted to a jury.
63. Roy v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 262 Mich. 663, 668, 247 N.W. 774, 776 (1933) ("A
strict legal right, if incompatible with the equities of the case, docs not necessarily
entitle one to equitable redress."); Fox v. Holcomb, 32 Mich. 494, 495.95 (1875).
64. 381 Mich. 445, 164 N.W.2d 43 (1969). See Christenson, supra note 3, at 317-20,
for a discussion of the use of an expanded doctrine of public nuisance.
65. While there is a general rule that equity will not enjoin the commission of a
crime, courts have been willing to disregard the rule. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kelley v.
Marco Sales Co., No. 13622C (Ingham County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Dec. 8, 1972): "While
courts generally do not interfere to prevent a breach of a penal ordinance or statute,
they may properly do so under certain circumstances to prevent the continuance of a
nuisance incidental thereto or arising therefrom." No. 13622C, opinion at 3. See also
Township of Garfield v. Young, 348 Mich. 337, 341, 82 N.W.2d 876, 878 (1957), where
the court said that, "if we have in truth a public nuisance, the fact that it is also a
criminal act will not stay the chancellor's hand."
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fendants' practice of examining eyes for contact lenses without the
supervision of a licensed optometrist, oculist, or ophthalmologist.
On appeal, the Michigan supreme court stated that
[a]t common law, acts in violation of the law constitute a public
nuisance. Harm to the public is presumed to fl.ow from the violation
of a valid statute enacted to preserve public health, safety and welfare. The attorney general, acting on behalf of the people, is a proper
party to bring an action to abate a public nuisance or restrain unlawful acts which constitute a public nuisance. The existence of a criminal or other penalty ... will not oust equity from jurisdiction.66
The court said that the attorney general had the power to sue to
enjoin the violation of a statute if that violation resulted in a public
nuisance. The dissenting justices, in an opinion by Justice Adams,
also agreed: "It may be concluded that, while courts of equity will
not customarily interfere to prevent the breach of a penal ordinance
or statute, they may exercise equity jurisdiction to abate public
nuisances affecting health, morals, or safety, or to protect a public
property right or interest." 67 Justice Adams disagreed, however,
with the court's position that the requisite showing of harm to the
public could be presumed. In his examination of the facts, he could
find no injury to the public as a result of the defendants' activities.
The dissenters would have held that
[p]roof of a statutory violation of a regulatory statute that bears a
reasonable relation to the public health and welfare, wher1:; such
statute contains criminal penalties that have not been pursued,
where no injunctive remedy has been statutorily conferred, and
where injury to the public by such violation or violations has not
been made out, is insufficient to establish a public nuisance meriting
the invocation of equity jurisdiction.6 8

a

66. 381 Mich. at 465-66, 164 N.W.2d at 53. The majority did not cite any sources for
its conclusions, but support can be found in English cases. See, e.g., Attorney-General v.
Shrewsbury (Kingsland) Bridge Co., 21 Ch. D. 752, 755-56 (1882); Attorney-General v.
Cockermouth Local Bd., L.R. 18 Eq. C. 172, 178 (1874).
67. 381 Mich. at 457, 164 N.W.2d at 48.
68. 381 Mich. at 465, 164 N."W.2d at 53. Justice Adams' claim that the plaintiff.
must show injury to the public and that the injury should not be presumed is supported by an earlier opinion of the Michigan supreme court. In Township of Garfield
v. Young, 348 Mich. 337, 82 N.W.2d 8-76 (1957), the court unanimously held tha.t the.
plaintiff township could not secure an injunction for the violation of an ordinance
passed to protect the public health, welfare, or safety unless it could prove actual injury
to the public as a result of the violation. The cases can be distinguished in that Peterson
involved a state statute, while Young involved a municipal ordinance. The court in
Peterson, however, did not address the issue of presumption at all beyond categorically
stating that it would presume injury to the public. But see Attorney-General v. Shrewsbury (Kingsland) Bridge Co., 21 Ch. D. 752, 756 (1882) (attorney-general can secure an
injunction restraining illegal activities without showing actual injury to the public).
The Peterson majority also failed to answer the question of whether the defendant had
the opportunity to overcome the presumption by presenting evidence to show that there
was no actual public injury.
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Even assuming that the dissenters are correct and that harm to
the public is not to be presumed but must be proved, the holding
that the violation of a statute enacted to protect the public health,
safety, or welfare constitutes a public nuisance enjoinable by the
attorney general gives the attorney general the opportunity to control serious violations of Michigan's consumer protection statutes. 00
This power is limited by the courts' discretionary power to refuse
to issue an injunction even if a public nuisance is properly shown.70
Again, the effectiveness of the attorney general's program will depend
to a substantial degree upon the cooperation of the courts.
Other weapons, which the attorney general can use to protect
consumers from the acts of corporations that violate their charters
by the misuse or abuse of their corporate powers, are his statutory71
and common law72 quo warranto powers. His primary quo warranto
power is found in a statute that gives him the power to seek ouster
for misuse, nonuse, or surrender of corporate powers.78 A corporation that engages in any activity, including consumer fraud and
pollution,74 that is not granted to it by its charter may be ousted
from the exercise of that activity. The attorney general also has the
power to bring quo warranto actions for violations of several specific
statutes. For example, he may bring such an action under Michigan's antitrust statutes.75 These quo warranto powers are limited
The majority's opinion, a very brief one, may also be challenged on two other
grounds. First, although the attorney general could have brought a criminal action
against the defendant, the court did not discuss the inadequacy of the remedy at law.
Second, the court failed to indicate whether it balanced the equities in order to
determine if the facts of the case were such as to warrant the issuance of an injunction.
Since the court issued an injunction, it must have decided both of these issues in favor
of the attorney general. In the future, the attorney general should properly address
these issues so that his activities will not be cut short by a tardy judicial recognition of
bidden issues.
69. See Comment, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer Protection, 83
U. CHI. L. REV, 590 (1966).
'10. See note 63 supra.
71. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.4501-.4545 (1968). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.3601 (1968), granting the circuit courts jurisdiction to restrain corporations
from exercising rights, privileges, and franchises not granted to them by the state.
'12. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •262-63. At common law, the attorney general
had the authority, by a writ of quo warranto, to annul or vacate the charter of a
corporation for violations of its charter because of misuse or abuse of corporate powers,
73. MICH. Co11rP. LAws ANN. § 600.4521 (1968):
If a corporation has, by a misuser, nonuser, or surrender, forfeited its corporate
rights, privileges and francbises, the judgment in an action for quo warranto shall
oust and exclude such corporation from corporate rights, privileges and franchises,
and may dissolve the corporation. In addition to such judgment or in lieu thereof
(except in case of such surrender), the court may impose a fine not exceeding
$10,000.00 upon the corporation. The fine will not prevent further prosecution for
any continuance or repetition of the conduct complained of.
74. For an example of the use of this quo warranto power, see Attorney General v.
Capitol Servs., Inc., 355 Mich. 545, 94 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
75. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.702-,703 (1967). Other specific statutes authorizing
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in two respects. First, they may be used only against corporate consumer fraud or pollution. Second, they are limited by the marked
reluctance of Michigan courts to allow their full exercise.76 The
statutes allow the courts to exercise discretion in deciding whether
to order an ouster or, in the alternative, to order the defendant to
pay a fine. 77 Fines are often an ineffective means of controlling fraud
or pollution and can be looked upon by businesses as a cost of business.78 In any case, the quo warranto power does provide an effective weapon for the attorney general in some cases. When dealing
with situations where the only effective remedy is ouster or dissolution, the attorney general may persuade the courts to cooperate
in his use of the quo warranto power to seek an ouster from any
ultra vires actions that result in unfair consumer practices or pollution.
Additional power to deal ·with consumer problems can be found
in Michigan's licensing and regulation statutes. The attorney general is expressly given the power to prosecute violations of some of
these statutes.79 Under other statutes, where no express grant of
power is found, 80 the attorney general derives his power to prosecute violations from his general authority to represent all state
agencies and boards. This broad power to prosecute and to prevent
both the misuse of existing licenses and the unlicensed practice of
a trade or profession is limited by the fact that the attorney general
must generally wait for a request from the respective licensing agency
the use of the attorney general's quo warranto power upon violation include the
statute prohibiting contracts in the restraint of trade, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.735
(1967); the statute regulating unfair discrimination and competition in the petroleum
industry, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.797 (1967); and the fair-trade statute controlling
the bakery and petroleum industries. MICH. COMP. LAWS A!'iN. § 445.180 (1967).
76. See, e.g., Attorney General ex rel. James v. National Cash Register Co., 182 Mich.
99, 126-28, 148 N.W. 420, 429 (1914).
77. The quo warranto statute was amended in 1961 to reflect this reluctance on the
part of the courts to enforce ouster or dissolution, See Revised Judicature Act. No. 236,
§ 4521, [1961] Mich. Pub. 8: Loe. Acts 566. The statute now reads that the court "may
dissolve the corporation." MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 600.4521 (1968) (emphasis added).
It formerly read that "judgment shall be rendered that such corporation be ousted •••
and that the said corporation be dissolved." 4 MICH. COMP. LAws § 638,21 (1948)
(emphasis added).
78. See note 250 infra.
79. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.525 (1967) (accountants); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 338.740 (1967) (foresters); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.572(2) (Supp.
1973) (land surveyors and architects); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.1044 (1967) (marriage counselors).
80. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 331.651-.660 (1967), as amended, MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 331.654 (Supp. 1973) (nursing homes); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 338.251-.262 (1967), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.253 (Supp. 1973)
(optometrists); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 338.1101-.1131 (1967), as amended, (Supp.
1973) (pharmacists); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 451,201-.219 (1967), as amended, MICH.
CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 451.211, .213, .217b (Supp. 1973) (real estate brokers).
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or board before he may take action; 81 his effective use of licensing
statutes to protect the consumer will thus depend to a substantial
degree upon the policies of each licensing agency. While there is in
practice rarely any conflict betlveen the attorney general's office and
the licensing agencies as to when action should be taken,82 this
potential limit on the attorney general's power does exist.
The attorney general is given a variety of other powers to deal
with consumer problems. For example, he can prosecute for violations of Michigan's food and drug control statutes.83 He has power to
control the activities of corporations under the antitrust laws84 and
the authority to enforce securities statutes regulating public utilities.85 The insurance industry is specificially subject to the attorney
general's control,86 and he also has the power to enforce the statutes
controlling misrepresentation and deception in the advertising of
condominiums.87 Finally, the attorney general has the power to enforce the Land Sales Act, 88 which prohibits unfair and deceptive
trade practices in the sale of land.
The powers discussed above give the attorney general a basis
from which to attack consumer fraud problems. The lack of a comprehensive protection statute is partially overcome by the use of the
quo warranto power to oust corporations from unfair and deceptive
practices, and false advertising may be effectively controlled under
the false advertising act. The lack of a comprehensive statute, however, cannot be totally overcome by the use of statutes that protect
the consumer from only the most obvious of offenses.
C. Environmental Protection Powers of the Attorney General
The Michigan Constitution of 1963 declares the conservation and
development of the state's natural resources to be of "paramount
public concern" and gives the legislature an affirmative duty to protect the environment.89 As the chief law enforcement officer, the
81. Styka Interview, supra note 19. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.10-14
(1967) (marriage counselors). But see MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.220a (1967) (dentists).
, 82. Styka Interview, supra note 19.
83. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 289.7 (1967).
84. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.702-.703, .707, .735 (1967).
85. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.302 (1967).
86. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 500_.228, .230 (1967).
87. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.28(3) (1967).
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 565.801-.835 (Supp. 1973). The Act provides for
enforcement through the Department of Licensing and Regulation,
89. MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52: "The conservation and development of the natural
resources of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the
interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall
provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state
from pollution, impairment and destruction."
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attorney general is charged with the enforcement of all laws that the
legislature passes in fulfilling this constitutional mandate.
While the attorney general is charged with this duty, he has considerable discretion in deciding how to fulfill his role. It could be
argued that he would be subject to a mandamus action for any
breach of the duty to protect the environment.90 The difficulty with
such an argument is that his duty is not a ministerial one, and only
the fulfillment of a ministerial duty can be compelled by the courts
under Michigan law.91 The attorney general's discretion as a prosecutorial official makes mandamus difficult to obtain.92
The traditional source of the attorney general's power to deal
with pollution is his common law power to abate public nuisances. 93
This power has been incorporated into several statutory provisions.
Any plant constructed or operated in violation of the Sewage Disposal
Plant Act94 is declared to be a public nuisance, and the attorney
general is given the power to bring an abatement action.95 Likewise,
under the Water Resources Commission Act,96 the discharge into the
waters of the state of any substance that is or may become injurious
to the public health or to the environment is prima facie evidence of
the existence of a public nuisance, and the attorney general may
bring an abatement action.97 Under the Air Pollution Act, 98 the
90. Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving
Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1132 (1970).
91. Taylor v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 343 Mich. 440, 444, 72 N.W.2d 146, 148 (1955);
Toan v. McGinn, 271 Mich. 28, 34, 260 N.W. 108, 111 (1935). The Michigan courts also
require the plaintiff in a mandamus action to show "a clear legal right to performance
of the specific act sought to be compelled," Iron County Bd. of Supervisors v. City of
Crystal Falls, 23 Mich. App. 319, 322, 178 N.W.2d 527,529 (1970), and that the defendant has "the clear legal duty to perform" the act. Toan v. McGinn, 271 Mich. 28, 34,
260 N.W. 108, lll (1935).
92. Mandamus will lie, however, in order to compel a public official to exercise
the discretion vested in him. See, e.g., Shipman v. State Live-Stock Sanitary Commn.,
ll5 Mich. 488,491, 73 N.W. 817, 818 (1898); Cicotte v. County of Wayne, 59 Mich. 509,
514, 26 N.W. 686, 687 (1886); People ex rel. Brower v. Judge of Wayne County Court,
1 Mich. 359, 362 (1850). See also ICC v. United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co.,
224 U.S. 474, 484 (1912); Robinson, Securing Civil Rights in Michigan and the Growth
of the Law, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 3, 49-50 n.181 (1968). But see Local 321, State, County
&: Municipal Workers of America v. City of Dearborn, 3ll Mich. 674, 679-80, 19
N.W.2d 140, 142 (1945) (dictum).
93. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, Co111J11ENTARIES •219-20; 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JUIUSPRU·
DENCE 202-04 (1836). See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
94. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 123.271-.275 (1967).
95. MICH. Co111P. LAws ANN. § 123.274 (1967). The action may also be brought by
"any one or more of the property owners within the city or village in which said
building, plant, or work is attempted to be placed in violation of this act." MICH.
Co111P. LAws ANN.§ 123.274 {1967).
96. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§§ 323.1-.13 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
97. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6(c) (Supp. 1973). The Act provi~es additional
remedies. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973).
98. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 336.11-.36 (1967), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN.§§ 336.12-.15, .17-.26, .28 (Supp. 1973).
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attorney general's power to abate public nuisances caused by air
pollution is preserved: "Nothing in this act ... shall abridge or alter
rights of action or remedies now or hereafter existing, nor shall any
provision of this act . • . be construed as estopping individuals • . .
from the exercise of their respective rights to suppress nuisances or to
prevent or abate air pollution." 99 This statutory enactment of certain
common law powers does not preclude the retention of the attorney
general's general common law power to abate public nuisances,:1° 0
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act (EPA)101 gives the
attorney general broad power to take action to protect the air, water,
and other natural resources of the state. Under the Act the attorney
general, or any other person or legal entity, may bring an action for
declaratory or equitable relief, including damages,102 for the protection of the environment.103 Upon a showing that the defendant's
activities are causing impairment or destruction of the environment,
a court may grant temporary or permanent equitable relief or impose
conditions upon the defendant to protect the environment.104 The
success that the attorney general, or any party, will have in using the
EPA again depends to a great degree on the will and ability of the
courts.105 The courts are not required to grant relief whenever pollution is demonstrated; the Act provides that "[t]he court may grant
temporary and permanent equitable relief . . . ."100 Unless the
attorney general can persuade the court to take action, the Act will
not substantially add to his power to control pollution. The considerations that go into a court's decision under the Act will probably
be very similar to those that go into its consideration of a public
nuisance abatement action. At present, it is unclear whether the
Michigan courts will interpret the Act to be a mandate for them to
act in environmental matters.107
99. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 336.34 (1967).
100. See note 11 supra.
IOI. MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1973). For discussion of the
EPA and its operation during its first years, see Sax &: Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1004 (1972): Sax
&: DiM:ento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience under the Mlclligan
Environmental Protection Act - EcoLOGY L.Q. - (1974).
102. While the draftsmen of the EPA did not envision the provision as allowing for
a damage remedy, Interview with Prof. Jose_{)h L. Sax, principal draftsman of the
Michigan EPA, March 15, 1974, it appears that the equitable restitutionary remedy
of return to the status quo ante would be available. Cf. text accompanying notes 169·
70 infra. For example, if the defendant's operation of a. landfill were enjoined under
the EPA, the court could order him to restore the land to its original condition or to
pay an amount of money sufficient to have the land restored to its original condition.
103. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1973).
104. MICH, COMP, LAWS ANN. § 691.1204(1) (Supp. 1973).
105. Sax&: Conner, supra note 101, at 1005, 1031-50.
106. MICH. Co111P. LAWS ANN. § 691.1204(1) (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
107. For discussion of the judicial response to the EPA as a source of substantive
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Under the EPA, the attorney general is also permitted to petition
to intervene in any administrative or licensing proceeding, or any
judicial review of such a proceeding, by filing a pleading that asserts
that the proceeding, or the action for judicial review, involves conduct that has, or is likely to have, harmful effects on the environment.108 If the agency or court finds that harmful effects will result,
it cannot authorize or approve the conduct unless there are no
feasible and prudent alternatives,109 Under the Act the power to
allow the attorney general to intervene is discretionary; the Act only
states that the agency or court "may permit" an intervention,110
However, the attorney general may be able to intervene as a matter
of right under his general intervention power.111 While ~he EPA
itself gives him no such right, it does give him a weapon in his efforts
to persuade the courts to cooperate in an environmental protection
program, for the Act certainly expresses a legislative intent to allow
the attorney general to implement the mandate of the Michigan
constitution.112
law, see Sax &: Conner, supra note 101, at 1054-64; Sax &: DiMento, supra note 101, manuscript at 105-10. See Brotz v. Detroit Edison Co., No. 2201 (Livingston County, Mich.,
Cir. Ct., Dec. 26, 1973), where the court disagreed with a probate court holding, In re
Detroit Edison Co., No. 18146, at 11 (Livingston County, Mich., Probate Ct., Feb. 7,
1973), that the EPA was only procedural in nature and did not grant any substantive
powers to the courts. No. 2201, opinion at 2. See Sa.x &: DiMento, supra, manuscript at
50-5la, See gener(llly Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 }4Rv. L, REv. 383
(1908): StoJle, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV, L. R.Ev. 4, 12-16 (1936).
108. MICH. Co11rP, LAWS ANN, § 691,1205(1) (Supp, 1973).
109. MICH, CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1205(2) (Supp. 1973).
110. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1205(1) (Supp. 1973). The Act does not confer
an absolute right upon the attorney general or any other person to intervene. In any
case, the agency or court may permit the intervention. In addition, an agency or court
may be under a constitutional obligatioJl to allow intervention, :;ee note 89 $Upr(l, but
the Act does not require it to do so. In at least one case, Wayne County Dept. of
Health v, Chrysler Corp,, No. 166-224 (Wayne County, Mich., Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 1970),
afjd., 4;! Mich. App. 235, 203 N.W.2d 912, motion for leave to appeal denied, 388
Mich. 812 (1972), a court has held that intervention under the Act is permissive.
The attorney general does, however, have the right to intervene under MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN, § 14.28 (1967), which provides, in part, that the attorney general "may,
when in his own judgment the interests of the state require it, intervene in and appear
for the people of this state in any .•• court or tribunal, in any cause or matter, civil
or criminal, in which the people of this state may be a party or interested." See Sax
&: Conner, supra note 101, at 1069-72.
111. MICH. COMP, LAws ANN. §§ 14.28, .101 (1967).
112. The EPA provides that an action under the Act be brought •'in the circuit
court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur."
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1973). See Sax &: Conner, supra note 101,
at 107~-76. However, the general statutes that apply to the attorney general allow him
to bring suits in Ingham County. MICH, Co111P. LAws ANN. §§ 600.1631(a) (1968). The
attorney general can use this venue power to pressure the violator by forcing him to
present his case in a foreign tribunal. The defendant is, however, protected by the
court rules from any venue location that would cause serious prejudice to his defense.
See, e.g., MICH. Cr. R. 403: "[T]he venue of any civil action properly laid • • • may
be changed to any other county by order of the court upon timely motion by one of
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The Water Resources Commission Act113 and the Air Pollution
Act establish administrative commissions that have the power to
create and enforce permit systems115 and to promulgate standards to
control pollution.116 In addition, in October 1973, Michigan, and
hence these commissions, received authority from the federal government, under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 117 to assume
the responsibility of issuing and enforcing permits regulating the
discharge of pollutants into lakes and streams.118 This authorization
not only allows the state to enforce the more strict standards of the
federal Act but also brings a substantial amount of federal funding
to implement the program.110 As the legal representative of both
commissions, the attorney general has the power and the duty to
enforce the state and federal standards and permit systems.
The permit systems themselves, however, may also create an
obstacle to any program created by the attorney general to fight pollution, for it is not clear whether the attorney general may bring an
action to enjoin an activity as a public nuisance where the business
or corporation engaged in that activity is operating under a valid
permit or within the standards of the regulatory agencies. The
attorney general does have the power to intervene in the administrative proceedings in which the permits are issued and the standards
established.120 However, if he should feel that the public interest was
114

the parties, for convenience of parties and witnesses, ••• or when an impartial trial
cannot be had in the county wherein the action is pending." In fact, the expression
of a legislative intent that an environmental action be brought in the county where
the pollution is occurring may persuade the courts to side with the defendant on any
motion for change of venue.
ml. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 323.1-13 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973),
114. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 336.11-.36 (1967), as amended, MICH, Co!IIP, LAWS
ANN. §§ 336.12-.15, .17-.26, .28 (Supp. 1973).
115. The permit systems for water pollution are established in MICH. COMP, LAws
ANN. §§ 323.5(b), 323.7 (Supp. 1973). The air pollution permit system is established in
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 336.15(b) (Supp. 1973).
116. The Air Pollution Control Commission has the power under MICH. COMP,
LAws ANN. § 336.15(a) (Supp. 1973) to "[e]stablish standards for ambient air quality and
for emissions."
117. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (Supp. II, 1972).
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
II9. The total amount of the federal grant to the state to assist in the enforcing of
the strict pollution standards is approximately one million dollars for the fiscal year
beginning July I, 1973. Approximately fifty thousand dollars is restricted for use in
legal enforcement of standards. At the present time, the money in the grant that is
allocated for legal enforcement has not yet been appropriated to the attorney general's
office. A conflict with the Civil Service Commission has resulted in a refusal by the
Commission to authorize the positions for the EPNRD. Consequently, the money is be•
ing wasted. Interview with Stewart H. Freeman, Assistant Attorney General, En•
vironmental Protection and Natural Resources Division, Michigan Attorney General's
Office, Lansing, Michigan, Feb. 8, 1974,
120. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 14.28 (1967).
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not sufficiently protected by such intervention, he may want to bring
an action to enjoin those activities as a public nuisance.121 Fortunately, both the Water Resources Commission Act and the Air Pollution Act state that they shall not be construed so as to repeal any of
the prior laws relating to pollution control.122 In addition, the Air
Pollution Act explicitly allows municipalities to establish ordinances
and regulations that are more strict than the minimum applicable
requirements of the Act.123 These provisions indicate that the two
Acts are to serve as one more additional tool in the government's fight
against pollution.
A recent Michigan case supports the proposition that the attorney
general retains his common law power to abate public nuisances even
if the defendant is operating in accordance with administrative regulations. In White Lake Improvement Association v. City of Whitehall,124 an environmental protection association sought to enjoin the
pollution of White Lake by the City of Whitehall and the Whitehall
Leather Company. After agreeing that the plaintiff association had
standing to challenge the city's action,125 the court concluded that,
while the Water Resources Commission Act did not provide an exclusive remedy for such pollution, it did provide a remedy that the
plaintiff had not yet exhausted.126 Relying on the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction,127 the court required the association to bring its com121. There may be several reasons why the attorney general might not want to
use this power to bring an action after an administrative agency has dealt with an issue.
First, such an action would threaten a close working relationship between the attorney
general and the agency. Second, if the attorney general repeatedly challenged the actions of the agencies, he would effectively destroy the agencies' ability to control pollution through the permit system, for the public would properly conclude that it
could no longer rely upon or base its activities on the permits issued by the agencies.
Consequently, the attorney general should use his power sparingly, perhaps only
when the agency is clearly wrong or when the agency's decision is motivated by
factors other than environmental concerns. There has been only one recent case in
which the attorney general has sought relief after agency action. That case was Kelley
v. National Gypsum Co., No. 1918 (Alpena County, Mich. Cir. Ct., Sept. 25, 1973).·
Telephone Interview with Stewart H. Freeman, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, March 13, 1974.
122. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 323.12 (water pollution), 336.35 (ait pollution)
(1967).
123. MICH. Cm,rP. LAWS ANN. § 336.36(1) (1967).
124. 22 Mich. App. 262, 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970).
125. 22 Mich. App. at 271-74, 177 N.W.2d at 476-78.
126. 22 Mich. App. at 276-79, 177 N.W.2d at 479-80.
127. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been explained as follows:
[l]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventionai experience of judges
or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by
Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so
even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence
serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and
consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are
secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally
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plaint before the Water Resources Commission before it sought relief
in the courts.128
A party who, unlike the White Lake plaintiff, had complained to
the Commission first would be required to seek judicial review of the
Commission's action under the state Administrative Procedures
Act.129 Then the party may "initiate an action in equity to abate the
nuisance if it still feels itself aggrieved and entitled to equitable
relie£"; 130 the court said that the Water Resources Commission Act
"contemplates that existing common law remedies are not abolished."131 The implication is that the attorney general would also be
able to bring an action in equity if he first exhausted his administrative remedies.
Several recent circuit court decisions indicate that the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act may provide some relief from the
strict primary jurisdiction doctrine.132 The EPA provides, in part,
that "[i]f administrative, licensing or other proceedings are required
or available to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the
court may remit the parties to such proceedings."133 This section was
expressly designed to relieve the courts from the dictates of primary
jurisdiction in actions under the EPA.184 Since the attorney general's
powers to enjoin pollution under the EPA are largely coextensive
with his powers to abate many public nuisances, the courts should
likewise limit their application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
in common law actions to those cases where administrative action is
clearly warranted. When faced with a situation similar to that presented in White Lake, a court may no longer be required to adhere
exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances
underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by
specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more fle.'>:ible procedure.
Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952). See generally Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and its Rationalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315 (1956);
Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1037 (1964).
128. 22 Mich. App. at 282, 177 N .W.2d at 482.
129. 22 Mich. App. at 282, 177 N.W.2d at 482. See MICH. CoMP, LAws ANN.
§§ 24.201-.315 (Supp. 1973).
130. 22 Mich. App. at 282, 177 N.W.2d at 482.
131. 22 Mich. App. at 279, 177 N.W.2d at 481.
132. See Water Resources Commn. v. Chippewa County, No. 1255 (Chippewa
County, Mich., Cir. Ct., May 27, 1971) (Opinion on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment): Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township of Northfield, 3 E.R.C. 1893
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972). Cf. Kelley v. National Gypsum Co., No. 1918 (Alpena County,
Mich., Cir. Ct., Sept. 25, 1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 202-05 infra. See
also Sax&: Conner, supra note 101, at 1019-27.
133. MtcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 691.1204(2) (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added),
134. Sax&: Conner, supra note 101, at 1019-20.
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intractably to the principle of primary jurisdiction.135 Because the
predominant rationale behind the doctrine was to follow the legislative intent for uniformity and for utilization of agency expertise, this
later expression of legislative intent should be read as a directive to
the courts to free themselves from the strictures of primary jurisdiction in environmental matters and to base their decisions on the
need to protect the environment.136 The Water Resources Commission Act137 and the Air Pollution Act138 support this thesis in that
they also contemplate a system with dual remedies.
In an equitable action to abate a public nuisance, the existence of
a permit may cause further problems for the attorney general in that
the defendant may claim its permit as a defense to the attorney general's action. The Michigan courts, however, have held that "[n]o
state agency is free to maintain a nuisance, and hence it cannot permit or require another person to do so."139
135. See Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township of Northfield, 3 E.R.C. 1893,
1901 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972):
This Court is of the opinion that White Lake, and the rules set out therein, is
no longer controlling in that [the Environmental Protection Act] denies the Water
Resources Commission primary jurisdiction in matters such as are now before the
Court. The primary jurisdiction doctrine was the controlling factor employed by
the Court of Appeals in its disposition of White Lake but such doctrine was • • •
employed in the absence of the language now found in [the Environmental Protection Act]. It should be understood herein that this Court does not disagree
with the rationale for nor the necessity of the primary jurisdiction doctrine but
merely points out that the same is not absolutely controlling herein.
136. In Water Resources Commn. v. Chippewa County, No. 1255 (Chippewa
County, Mich., Cir. Ct., May 27, 1971) (Opinion on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment), the court noted that the administrative process normally should not be bypassed. However, the court continued: "[A)s the Court of Appeals indicated, there are
no hard and fast rules for application of the 'primary jurisdiction' doctrine; and
whether to apply it to a particular case depends upon many circumstances •••• The
interest of justice will not be served by the Court passing the problem back to the
Water Resources Commission at this time." No. 1255, opinion at 5.
137. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 323.6 (Supp. 1973): "[I]n addition to the remedies
provided for in this act [any violation] may be abated according to law in an action
brought by the attorney general in a court of competent judisdiction."
138. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 336.34 (1967).
139. Ebel v. Saginaw County Bd. of Road Commrs., 386 Mich. 598, 607, 194 N.W.2d
365, 369 (1972). The court also said:
Compliance with the [public service] commission's orders for the installation and
maintenance of certain [railroad crossing] warning devices are among the circumstances and certainly evidence the jury should consider in determining whether the
railroad was negligent, but it cannot be said as a matter of law that compliance
with such commission's order is to be equated as freedom from negligence•
• • • It cannot be said however that under all circumstances compliance with an
order of the commission absolves a railroad from liability for maintaining a nuisance in fact.
886 Mich. at 606-07, 194 N.W.2d at 368-69 (emphasis original).
The EPA gives the courts the authority to examine the standards and rules promulgated by an administrative agency and, if necessary to protect properly the en•
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The attorney general also has the authority under the Water
Resources Commission Act and the Air Pollution Act to seek restitution for "the full value of the injuries done to the natural resources
of the state and the costs of surveillance and enforcement by the state
resulting from the ... violation."140 This remedy is in addition to
injunctive relief and a prescribed fine and is supplemented by the
attorney general's continuing common law power to recover damages
for injuries done to the lands or property of the state.141
Several recent statutes give the attorney general additional powers
to protect the natural resources of the state. For example, the Inland
Lakes and Streams Act of I 972142 is, as its title indicates, designed to
vironment, to order and determine new standards. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(2)
(Supp. 1973), provides:
,
In granting relief ••• where there is involved a standard for pollution or for
an anti-pollution device or procedure, fixed by rule or otherwise, by an instrumentality or agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof, the court may:
(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness of the standard.
(b) When a court finds the standard to be deficient, direct the adoption of a
standard approved and specified by the court.
When the attorney general brings his action, the court now has the power to review
the administrative standards de novo. The court would not be involved in the judicial
review of an administrative order. See Lakeland Property Owners Assn. v. Township
of Northfield, 3 E.R.C. 1893, 1901 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972). The court, upon finding that
the administrative standards do not sufficiently protect the environment, may order
the adoption of standards that it feels arc proper. See 3 E.R.C. at 1901: "[The court]
can direct the Water Resources Co=ission to adopt a different pollution standard
without a judicial review of Commission proceedings wherein standards were adopted
and by virtue of (the Environmental Pxotection Act] can direct the Commission to
adopt different standards ••••"

140. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 323.10 (water pollution), 336.26 (air pollution)
(Supp. 1973). There is an inconsistency in the two damage provisions with respect to
the attorney general's power to bring an action for recovery without agency recommendation. In the air pollution provision, the attorney general is given the power to
file an action for recovery "at the request of the commission." In a 1972 amendment
to the Water Resources Commission Act the attorney general is simply given the
power to bring the recovery action. Act of June 5, 1972, No. 159, (1972] Mich. Pub.
&: Loe. Acts 257 (codified at MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973)). The legislature omitted the phrase "at the request of the department of conservation," which
had been in the earlier version of the Act. Act of Oct. 29, 1965, No. 405, § 10, [1965]
Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 825. Allowing the attorney general to bring an action for
water pollution on his own initiative but not allowing him to do so in the air pollu•
tion field is illogical and calls for legislative correction. The proper approach is to
allow the attorney general to bring an action for recovery on his own initiative in both
cases.
141. At common law, the attorney general had the power to prosecute all actions
necessary for the protection of the property and revenues of the Crown, 3 W. BLACK•
STONE, COMMENTARIES •257-58, and the power to bring an action by information to re•
cover damages for wrongs done to the land or to the possessions of the Crown. Id.
at •261-62.
142. MICH. CollfP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.951-.965 (Supp. 1973). Other statutes deslgrtcd
to protect the natural resources of the state include the Shorelands Protection and
Management Act of 1970, M1CH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 281.631-.645 (Supp. 1973): the
Natural River Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.761-.776 (Supp. 1973): the
Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Act of 1972, MICH. Cm,tP. LAWS ANN. §§ 282,101-,ll7
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protect and regulate Michigan lakes and streams. Enforcement of the
Act is delegated to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources/43
which is represented by the attorney general's office. The ·legislature
has also recently enacted various statutes to control specific forms of
pollution. For example, the 1969 Liquid Industrial Wastes Act144
controls the disposal of liquid industrial wastes into Michigan's
waters by requiring that persons engaged in discharging such wastes
from industrial premises be licensed and bonded. While the initial
enforcement powers are vested in the Water Resources Commission,145 the attorney general's office, as the legal representative of the
Commission, wields the enforcement power. His power is limited by
the requirement that he must await agency referral. If a violation of
the Acts constitutes a public nuisance, however, he should be able to
act after he has resorted to the agency.

II. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CURRENT UTILIZATION

OF

His

POWERS

An examination of how the Michigan attorney general's common
law and statutory powers are currently being used to protect the
public interest involves, first, a description of the general departmental structure of the attorney general's office and, second, a survey_
of the office's current activities.
The department is currently separated into twenty-one divisions,146 each of which represents several different state agencies and
boards. At the present time, the Environmental Protection and
Natural Resources Division (EPNRD) represents agencies and boards
involved in environmental protection. The divisions dealing with
consumer protection problems are the Consumer Protection and
Charitable Trusts Division (CPD), the Licensing and Regulation
Division (LRD), and the Special Litigation Division (SLD). This
structure does not preclude activities in consumer and environmental
areas by other divisions if such issues arise in the course of their
representation of other agencies and boards. This allocation of
(Supp. 1973); the Mineral Well Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 319.211-.236 (Supp.
1973); and the Wilderness and Natural Areas Act of 1972, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 322.751-.763 (Supp. 1973).
143. MICH, COMP. LA.ws ANN.§ 281.963(1) (Supp. 1973).
144. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 323.271-.280 (Supp. 1973). Other examples of recent legislation designed to control specific forms of pollution include the Cleaning
Agents Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 323.231-.236 (Supp. 1973); the Watercraft
Pollution Control Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 323.331-.342 (Supp. 1973);
and the Sewage Treatment Facilities Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 323.111-.128
(1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
145. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 323.279-.280 (Supp. 1973).
146. Styka Interview, supra note 19. The Attorney General's office is created. by
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 16.150-.154 (1967).
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responsibility allows assistant attorneys general to specialize in one
area of the law and thereby acquire the expertise necessary to provide effective protection.
The current activity of the divisions is limited to a great extent
by inadequate resources. 147 In comparison with offices in other states,
the Michigan attorney general's office is seriously understaffed in its
consumer and environmental divisions.148 No amount of organiza147. Styka Interview, supra note 19. For an example of an innovative attempt to
mitigate the problems of limited resources, see Burch, supra note 3, at 164-65, where the
Maryland Attorney General describes his use of Jaw students in a work-study program,
Partially funded by the federal government, the program provides the attorney general's office with the services of high quality Jaw students at minimal cost to the state,
148. Currently Michigan has eight full-time assistant attorneys genera], no in•
vestigators, and six clerical workers assigned to the Environmental Protection and
Natural Resources Division. The attorney general has assigned three full-time assistant
attorneys general, two investigators, one complaint examiner, and four clerical workers
to the Consumer Protection and Charitable Trusts Division. These three assistant
attorneys general must administer all charitable trusts, in addition to their consumer
protection activities. Styka Interview, supra note 19.
Figures for environmental attorneys in other states' attorneys general's offices can
be found in National Association of Attorneys General, Committee on the Office of
the Attorney General Special Report, Environmental Control Questionnaires: Com•
pilation of Responses 3-5 (August 22, 1973) [hereinafter Environmental Control Questionnaires]. The following table gives the figures for the environmental staffs of various states:
Number of Authorized Staff Positions in the Attorney General's Office
for Environmental Control Matters
(FT=Full-time; PT=Part-time)
Additional
Advisory Attorneys
Housed in State
ClericalEnvironmental
Secretary
Attorneys
Investigators
Agencies
State
IFT;3PT
lFr;lPT
None
lFT
Alabama
1FT;9PT
None
California
13FT
9½FT
4FT
3FT
None
None
Connecticut
IFT
None
2FT
9FT
Florida
19FT;l7PT
l0FT
7FT
Illinois
14FT
2Fr
None
2FT
Kentucky
4FT
lFT
5FT
2FT
6FT
Massachusetts
5FT
None
SFT
None
Michigan
None
4FT;2PT
2FT
Minnesota
7FT
None
lFT;lPT
2PT
None
Missouri
None
12FT
5FT
2FT
New Jersey
15FT
7FT
2FT
New York
22FT
9FT
24FT
2FT
None
Ohio
None
2PT
2PT
Pennsylvania
lFT
4FT
None
SFT
31FT
Texas
3FT;lPT
IFT;IPT
None
None
Virginia
None
2FT
West Virginia
3FT
None
2FT;IPT
IFT
6FT
IlFT
Wisconsin
Figures for consumer attorneys in other states can be found in National Association of Attorneys General, Committee on the Office of the Attorney General and
Consumer Protection Committee, State Programs for Consumer Protection 13 (bee,
1973) [hereinafter State Programs]. The following table provides representative figures:
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tion can overcome the problems inherent in a severe lack of resources.149 However, the attorney general is attempting to protect the
public interest as best he can.
The attorney general must accomplish two objectives if he is to
protect the public interest effectively in these areas. First, he must
secure the cessation of the harmful activities; second, he must secure
restitution to both the public and the state for harm done.100 The
settlement of a case without a remedy that prevents the continuation
of the harmful practice merely reduces the attorney general's action
to a cost of doing business, and prosecution without restitution may
discourage complaints and leave the public without an adequate
remedy.151 The lack of resources has, of necessity, led to the placing
Number of Authorized Staff Positions in the Attorney General's Office
for Consumer Protection Matters
(FT=Full-time; PT=Part-time)
ClericalSecretary
Investigators
State
Attorneys
Others"
IPT
None
IPT
!Fr
Alabama
14FT
!OFT
3FT
4Fr
California
3Fr
3Fr
2Fr
4Fr
Colorado
38FT;3PT
12FT;l8PT
20FT;l2PT
6PT
Illinois
5FT
None
4FT
llFT
Kentucky
4Fr
5FT
3FT;l5PT
2FT
Maryland
6FT
3FT
lFT
Michigan
3FT
4FT
4FT
lFT
4FT
Minnesota
3FT;3PT
4FT;lPT
2FT;2PT
Missouri
3FT
19FT;4PT
33Fr;10PT
20FT;IPT
IFT
NewYork
4FT
5FT
3FT;2PT
3FT
North Carolina
IOFT;2PT
9FT
8FT;3PT
12PT
Ohio
38FT
31FT
ISFT
3FT
Pennsylvania
8FT;2PT
None
3FT;5PT
15FT
Texas
12FT;2PT
SFT
4FT;l3PT
7FT
Wisconsin
• Includes education specialists, complaint examiners, interviewers, and student
aides.
149. Proper organization can, however, mitigate the problems that arise when a
prosecutorial office is faced with a shortage of resources. Perhaps it would be worth
the cost to reassign two or three assistant attorneys general from, for example, the
highway division to consumer or environmental protection. While the representation
provided to the Highway Department may suffer, the benefits gained by the addition
of attorneys to the consumer and environmental divisions may outweigh the loss.
The attorney general's office should seriously consider such a reallocation of resources.
150. Styka Interview, supra note 19. See OFFICE oF ATrORNEY GENERAL, supra
note 11, at 411 CTohn C. Danforth, Attorney General of Missouri):
I think that there are basically two theories for the operation of a consumer
protection program. One ••• is that the objective of such a division is to procure
refunds for consumers who complain to the division from businesses which may
have engaged in deceptive practices. The other alternative is to view the consumer
protection division less as an agency to procure restitution and more as an agency
to prevent deceptive practices.
151. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 411. See also W. MAGNUSON &
J. CARPER, supra note I, at 55-56, quoting Michael Frank, Attorney, Washington, D.C.,
legal aid office:
Many companies know they are violating the law, but they do it deliberately
because they are sure that few poor people will show up in court to defend
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of one goal over the other in some states.162 Fortunately, the approach
taken by the Michigan attorney general's office153 is to seek the fulfillment of both goals.
A.

Consumer Protection Activities

The major activity of the attorney general with regard to consumer protection is the mediation of consumer complaints.161 When
a complaint is received in the Consumer Protection and Charitable
Trusts Division, the complaint examiner and her staff review it and
either request more information from the consumer or contact the
businessman named. The businessman is informed that a complaint
has been filed, is sent a copy of the complaint, and is asked to explain
his actions. The CPD then asks him to refund the complainant's
money and to agree to refrain from such activities in the future. 166
If the CPD succeeds, its goals of obtaining restitution and of stopping
the fraudulent activity are fulfilled, and the case is considered
closed.156 The value of such an informal resolution is that, if properly
supported by a program of immediate prosecution when informal
agreement cannot be secured, it allows for the conservation of
resources, quick results, and a wide range of activities. The informal
agreements are, of course, not enforceable, and their efficacy is
dependant upon the good faith of the violator. However, if the
themselves, and the company will get a default judgment. If they lose a case, the
company won't appeal, because they don't want a precedent against them to be
set and to appear on the books. It is little matter to these dishonest firms if they
lose one small sale or suit. They are still in business, and they have their healthy
margin of profit. We catch them on one; they fleece twenty.
152. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 411.
153. Styka Interview, supra note 19.
154. Interview with Edwin M. Bladen, Assistant Attorney General, Consumer
Protection & Charitable Trusts Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing,
Michigan, August 27, 1973 [hereinafter Bladen Interview].
155. During the year of 1973, the CPD handled 8208 citizen complaints and secured
recoveries in the amount of $215,651.74. In 1972, the division handled '1293 complaints
and $249,331.43 was recovered. In 1971, 6089 complaints were processed, with re•
coveries of $165,959.45.
While the amounts recovered are quite substantial, they in no way approach the
amounts lost by Michigan consumers every year to consumer fraud. It has been CS•
timated that the Michigan consumers lose over a million dollars annually as a result
of unfair and deceptive trade practices. Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, at l·E, col. 4.
Another problem caused by the lack of resources in the CPD is that it takes ap•
proximately two weeks to handle a complaint. If sufficient resources were provided,
the time would be two to three days. Interview with Mrs. Fern Wright, Complaint
Examiner, Consumer Protection & Charitable Trusts Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, February 8, 19'74 [hereinafter Wright Interview),
156. The CPD estimates that approximately 40 per cent of the complaints result in
a successful recovery for the consumer. The other 60 per cent end in reference to other
units of government or reach a stalemate. Telephone Interview with Edwin M. Bladen,
Assistant Attorney General, Consumer Protection & Charitable Trusts Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, March 15, 1974 [hereinafter Bladen
Telephone Interview].
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attorney general adopts a policy of swift and forceful prosecution,
where possible, upon the breach of such agreements, the threat of
prosecution might be sufficient to compel compliance.
While the attorney, general lacks the power to bring an action
based simply upon an allegation of unfair or deceptive trade practices, if the businessman refuses to cooperate, the attorney general
does have several alternatives. As previously noted,1 57 he can use his
recently expanded power to sue to abate public nuisances for violations of consumer protection statutes. In People ex rel. Kelley v.
Marco Sales Co.,158 the CPD successfully obtained an injunction
restraining the defendant's use of the mails to conduct a lottery contrary to Michigan's lottery statute.159 The defendant was sending
Michigan residents punch cards that purportedly gave- the recipient
and his friends the opportunity to ·win a free grandfather chime clock.
After concluding that the defendants were operating the scheme in
such a way as to deceive and mislead Michigan consumers, the CPD
was able to bring an action to enjoin the activities as a public
nuisance under the Peterson rationale. 160
The case demonstrates another advantage of the Peterson rule.
Because the defendant was an Illinois corporation with no agents or
offices in Michigan, the attorney general was forced to use Michigan's
long-arm statute161 to secure limited personal jurisdiction over it.
Under the statute, the commission of a tort, or activities that lead to
a tort, in Michigan is sufficient to provide jurisdiction.162 Because the
violation of a statute passed to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare-in this case, the lottery statute-is a pubHc nuisance ~d
thus a tort, the court f,ound it had jurisdiction. The CPD's use of the
expanded definition of public nuisance is a major part of the
attorney general's consumer protection· program.163
157. See text accompanying notes 64-70 supra.
158. No.13622C (Ingham County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Dec. 8, 1972).
159. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.372-.376 (1967), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 750.372a (Supp. 1973).
160. See te.'!:t accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
161. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.715(1) (1968). The court admitted that: limited
personal jurisdiction could not be secured under the general jurisdictional · section,
MICH, COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.715(1) (1968), which provides that "[t]he transaction of
any business within the state" will provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. No.
13622C, opinion at 6. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
162. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.715(2) (1968), which pi;-ovides that "[t]he doing
or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an
action for tort" will provide a sufficient basis for limited personal jurisdiction. Tliis
section of the long-arm statute was held co~titutional in Woods v. Edgewater Amusement Park, 381 Mich. 559, 165 N.W.2d 12 (1969). See also Travelers Health Assn. v.
Virginia ex rel. State Corporation Commn., 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (issuance of injunction
restraining Nebraska firm from the use of the mails in Virginia to deliver insurance
certifications held not a violation of due process); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
163. Bladen Interview, supra note 154.
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The CPD has also been active under the authority given it by the
deceptive advertising statutes.164 For example, the division has
attempted to prevent bait advertising in the sale of magazine subscriptions by Time Incorporated, and its subsidiary, Family Publications Service, Inc., who were luring customers by offers of "free"
subscriptions. Their advertisements concealed the total costs of subscriptions and the duration of the subscription contracts. The CPD
issued a cease-and-desist order, which notified the respondent that,
unless the activities complained of were stopped within forty-eight
hours, the attorney general would initiate an action to secure an
injunction.165 The respondents agreed to enter into a voluntary assurance of compliance, in which they agreed both to stop the deceptive
advertising and to refund all monies paid by consumers for subscriptions.166 If the respondents had not agreed to the voluntary assurance
of discontinuance, the CPD could have brought an action under the
Act to secure an injunction.167 The advantage of securing a voluntary
assurance of discontinuance is that the CPD can force the respondent
to agree to refund monies gained as a condition of that agreement.
If the CPD is forced to take the case to court in order to secure an
injunction, the prospects of a recovery for the consumer are less,
since the attorney general has no statutory power to sue for restitution on belialf of the public.168
A recent California case,169 however, may prove useful to the CPD
164. M1CH, CoMP, LA.ws ANN. §§ 445.801-.809 (1967), as amended, M1CH, COMP, LAws
ANN. § 445.806 (Supp. 1973).
165. Notice to Cease and Desist, In re Time Inc., No. 70-1018 (Nov. 19, 1970),
Other recent examples of notices to cease and desist include: In re World Wide Sys•
tems, Inc., No. 73-1001 (March 6, 1973) (respondent ordered to stop advertising that
it had job positions available for truck drivers when it in fact had no such openings);
In re New York Carpet World, No. 72-1001 Gan. 10, 1972) (respondent ordered to dis•
continue advertising that claimed 50 per cent savings on carpeting that sold at a
"regular price" of $7.99 per square yard when carpeting's actual regular price was
$4.25 per square yard); In re Reader's Digest, No. 70-1020 (Dec. 2, 1970) (respondent
ordered to cease advertising in a manner that created false and fraudulent impressions
of endorsement or participation in promotional games). In 1973, 29 cease-and-desist
orders were issued. In 1972, 6 were issued, and 12 were issued in 1971. Bladen Inter•
view, supra note 154.
166. People ex rel. Leonard v. Harrell, No. 16693 (Genesee County, Mich., Cir. Ct,,
Nov. 25, 1970).
167. MICH, CoMP. LA.ws ANN. § 445.807(1) (1967). See, e.g., People ex rel. Attorney
General v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 37 Mich. App. 447, 467-68, 195 N.W.2d 43, 1,3
(1972), where the Michigan court of appeals reversed a trial court decision refusing
to issue an injunction against the defendant cosmetic corporation's marketing scheme,
which violated the false advertising act by using "misrepresented facts, exaggerated
claims and statistics, undisclosed facts, and false advertising."
168. Cf. text accompanying notes 28-35 supra.
169. People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 245, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192
(1973). The court noted that "a court of equity may exercise the full range of it!
inherent powers in order to accomplish complete justice between parties, restoring if
necessary the status quo ante as nearly as may be achieved •••• In particular, in an
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in its efforts to secure restitution for the consumer in conjunction
with an action to enjoin deceptive advertising. The California
supreme court held that the state attorney general could secure
restitution for the deceived consumers in an action to enjoin violations of California's deceptive advertising act.170 The Michigan
courts have not yet decided if they have the power, under the traditional doctrine that an equity court may render full and complete
relief once its jurisdiction has been properly invoked,171 to order a
return to the status quo ante in an action by the attorney general
under the Michigan deceptive advertising statute. Because its goal is
to secure both restitution for the defrauded consumer and cessation
of the deceptive practices, the CPD is currently attempting to establish that theory in Michigan.172
·
Because of the lack of a comprehensive consumer protection act,
the CPD uses the attorney general's quo warranto power to attack
deceptive trade practices outside the reach of the deceptive advertising statute. These powers are presently used in two ways; If a corporation misuses its powers in a way that involves unfair trade
practices, the CPD will bring an action to secure a partial ouster
from those abusive practices. If a corporation uses otherwise legal
means that are outside its granted powers to accomplish a purpose
inimical to the public welfare, the CPD will bring an action, for
partial ouster from that ultra vires act.173 The purpose of these quo
action by the Attorney General under [the false advertising act] a trial court has the
inherent power to order, as a form of ancillary relief, that the defendants make an
offer to make restitution to the consumers found to have been defrauded." 9 Cal. 3d
at 247, 507 P,2d at 1402, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 194. The court also said that it would not
allow the lower court to award exemplary damages unless the courts were given explicit
statutory authority to do so. See Comment, Fraudulent Advertising: The Right of a
Public Attorney to Seek Restitution for Consumers, 4 PAC. L.J. 168 (1973).
170. CAL. Bus.&: PROF. CODE § 17535 (West 1964), as amended, (West Supp. 1974).
A 1972 amendment specifically allows a government attorney to bring a restitution
action along with an action for an injunction.
171. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS §§ 72, 174 (1838). See Hecht
Company v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530, 551 (1913)
("A court of equity ought to do justice completely, and not by halves.").
172. See People ·ex rel. Kelley v. Anderson, No. 15875-C (Ingham County, Mich.,
Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 1, 1973), ,irhere the attorney general, using Peterson's expanded
definition of public nuisances, see text accompanying notes 64-69 supra, is seeking an
injunction for the abatement of a public nuisance-the violation of the deceptive advertising act. The attorney general has also asked that the court "order that the
status quo ante be restored as near may be, including ordering Defendants herein to
refund to each and every person within the State of Michigan such sums of money as
they may have expended as the result of reliance on the representations and advertisements of Defendants." No. 15875-c, complaint at 6;
173. Bladen Interview, supra note 154. For an example of a partial ouster action,
see Michigan Mobile Homeowners Assn. v. Chateau Enterprises, Inc., No. X72-4678
(l\facomb County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Oct. 6, 1972), where the attorney general intervened
and sought an injunctive order excluding the defendants "from exceeding the authority
expressed in defendants' corporate charters and abusing or misusing the franchise
power granted by the State of Michigan." No. X72-4678, complaint at 2.
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warranto actions is not necessarily to secure a total ouster of the
corporation, although such action is possible if the CPD feels that
the defendant is incapable of engaging in business without involving
itself in unfair practices.174 Rather, the goal is only to obtain a partial
ouster from the unfair practices.175 The use of the quo warranto
power alone will not provide any form of restitution to the consumer,
unless the attorney general can persuade the court to agree to a
return to the status quo ante as a part of its injunctive order of ouster.
Consequently, the CPD uses the threat of quo warranto actions to
secure voluntary consent judgments-which, inter alia, require
restitution.176
The CPD is active in other areas of consumer protection. For
example, it has been involved in the policing of unconscionable contracts,177 in court proceedings on the question of the proper venue in
a debtor-creditor relationship (must the creditor sue the debtor
where the debtor resides or where the creditor has its place of business?), 178 and in the prevention of pyramid-sales schemes.170 These
174. For a recent example of an action seeking total ouster, see People ex rel.
Kelley v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., No. 2676 (Grand Traverse County, Mich., Cir. Ct.,
filed Dec. 28, 1971), where the attorney general is asking for total ouster because of
the defendant's alleged unfair and deceptive trade practices.
175. Bladen Interview, supra note 154.
176. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kelley v. American Central Corp., No. 15398-C (Ing•
ham County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Aug. 23, 1973) where the attorney general forced the de•
fendant to comply with the provisions of the Michigan Land Sales Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 565.801-.835 (Supp. 1973). The defendant also agreed to submit to an
arbitration panel all unsettled rescission claims of defrauded consumers.
177. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kelley v. Cadillac Outfitting Furniture Co., No.
191336R (Wayne County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Nov. 21, 1972), where the attorney general
brought a quo warranto action against a furniture company soliciting inner-city business in Detroit, alleging that the defendant's business practices were unfair, unconscionable, and racially discriminatory. The attorney general secured a consent dissolution of the company and an injunction against the defendant excluding it from engaging in mercantile or credit business.
The attorney general has also been active in enforcing the Michigan Retail Installment Sales Act, MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.851-.872 (1967), as amended,
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.851a, .852, .865 (Supp. 1973). See, e.g., In re Domestic
Credit Corp., No. 11647-C (Ingham County, Mich., Cir. Ct., April 30, 1970) (defendants voluntary agreed to discontinue the inclusion of prohibited conditions and provisions).
178. See, e.g., Baby Prods. Co. v. Piskoti, No. DA-201 (Oakland County, Mich,,
Cir. Ct., Sept. 21, 1972) (Stipulation), where the plaintiff stipulated that it would
permanently "refrain in all future litigation from filing any suit to enforce any of
Plaintiff-Appellee's contracts in any District Court C.'i:cept the District Court in which
the defendant of said litigation resides." No. DA-2-01, stipulation at I. This concession
by the plaintiff is important for three reasons. First, it prevents this partcular company from using venue statutes to pressure the consumer. Second, and more importantly, it is a strong precedent for future action by the attorney general. Third, it
serves as notice to corporations that the attorney general will act if venue statues are
used improperly. The stipulation was incorporated into an injunction by order of the
court.
179. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kelley v. Dare To Be Great, Inc., No. 6650 (Washtenaw
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activities, with those discussed above, have provided a measure of
protection for the Michigan consumer. Again, the degree of this protection is limited by the lack of a comprehensive consumer protection
act and by the limited resources available to the CPD.
The Special Litigation Division is also active in consumer protection. Created in 1968, the SLD is primarily involved in representing
the public at rate hearings before the Michigan Public Service Commission.180 The attorney general established the division because the
Public Service Division of his office, the legal representative of and
advisor to the Public Service Commission, was not adequately representing the public interest at Commission hearings.181 Since 1969,
the SLD has intervened in every major rate-increase hearing before
the Commission in an effort to hold down increases in Michigan's
public utility rates.182 While the SLD intervention has been somewhat effective,183 the division is not properly staffed and funded. The
Commission is now capable of handling three major rate-increase
hearings simultaneously,184 and the effectiveness of the SLD's intervention power has thus been severely decreased, because its two
assistant attorneys general cannot juggle three major hearings. The
SLD also lacks the funds to hire the expert witnesses needed to rebut
the testimony of the utilities' expert witnesses.185 For the present, the
best that the SLD can do is to attempt to offset the massive investments of time and efforts by the utilities by pointing out the availability of alternative methods of calculating profit margins. The
problem has been magnified recently, for the SLD now also represents the state's interest in proceedings before the Federal Power
Commission and the Federal Energy Office. The division was given
these new i-esponsibilities without a corresponding increase in staff
and financial resources.1ss
The Licensing and Regulation Division represents each indiCounty, Mich., Cir. Ct., Dec. 4, 1972) (attorney general secured temporary and permanent injunctive relief against defendant's chain-referral marketing scheme).
180. Coy Interview, supra note 22. See generally Comment, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1367,
supra note 1. Cf. Comment, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1170,supra note 3.
181. Coy Interview, supra note 22. Cf. Comment, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1367, supra
note 1, at 1379-81.
182. The total number of interventions through 1973 is 42. Coy Interview, supra
note 22.
183. See, e.g., Michigan Bell Tel. Co., No. U--4293 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn.,
Dec. 21, 1973), where positions taken and supported solely by the attorney general's
office were adopted by the Michigan Public Service Commission and resulted in a
savings of 9,708,000 dollars to the public.
184. Coy Interview, supra note 22.
185. Coy Interview, supra note 22.
186. Telephone Interview with Roderick S. Coy, Assistant Attorney General, Special
Litigation Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, March 14,
1974.
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vidual licensing board's staff in proceedings for disciplinary action
under the licensing statutes, for revocation of existing licenses, and
for prevention of the unlicensed practice of a trade or profession. For
example, the LRD currently has five cases pending in Detroit
against building contractors.187 The division is seeking to enjoin the
contractors from further business activities because the attorney general's office has determined, as a result of consumer complaints, that
they are abusing their licenses or operating their businesses without
a license. The attorney general has also requested the courts to
appoint a receiver to take over the assets of the contractors and to
distribute them to those who have been defrauded.
The LRD has several advantages over the CPD in protecting the
public interest. First, many of the licensing statutes provide that the
licensing agency, and consequently the LRD, has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses at licensing proceedings.188 The CPD
does not have the power to subpoena witnesses in its investigations.189 Second, the power to revoke a businessman's license is
easier to exercise than the power to bring a quo warranto or public
nuisance action. These advantages have led the attorney general's
office to conclude that, whenever a businessman who is licensed by
the state is engaged in unfair consumer practices, the LRD is the
proper division to take action.190
The attorney general's office is involved in other consumer protection programs. The other divisions presently handle consumer
interest litigation when the agency they represent has an interest in
the litigation,191 and the office publishes several pamphlets, in both
English and Spanish, informing consumers of their rights under
Michigan laws.192 In order to encourage local action against consumer
187. Styka Interview, supra note 19. See, e.g., Kelley ex rel. Department of Licensing &: Regulation v. White, No. 73-229-230 CZ (Wayne County, Mich., Cir. Ct., filed
Feb. 12, 1973).
188. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 338.557 (architects, professional engineers,
and land surveyors), 338.502 (accountants) (1967).
189. Bladen Interview, supra note 154.
190. Styka Interview, supra note 19.
191. For example, the Commerce Division of the attorney general's office has represented the Department of Agriculture in controlling the quality of food in Michigan,
See, e.g., City Smoked Fish Co. v. Department of Agriculture, 47 Mich. App. 125, 209
N.W.2d 267 (1973), where the plaintiff challenged a department regulation requiring
a higher salt content for packaged fish than was required by federal regulations. The
court upheld the state regulation, but only to the extent that it regulated food processed for distribution within Michigan. However, in Armour &: Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d
76 (6th Cir. 1972), the attorney general and the Deparment of Agriculture failed in
an attempt to protect Michigan's strict requirements for the marketing, labeling, packaging, and ingredient contents in hot dogs and sausages. The court held that the
Federal Whole Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-95 (1970), pre-empted the field and that the
state regulations could not be enforced.
192. See, e.g., "The Michigan Consumer Survival Manual" (Manual de Super•
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problems, the CPD has published a manual entitled "A Short Course
on Consumer Protection Laws ,of Michigan," 193 which it has distributed to local prosecuting attorneys. The manual is designed to aid
local authorities in the procedural an:d substantive problems of consumer protection.194 Also, the CPD has issued guidelines, such as
"Guidelines for the Advertisement of Gasoline Prices by Retail Gas-.
oline Dealers in Michigan," 195 that give notice to businessmen that
certain activities will be considered to· be unfair and deceptive and
that the division will take action to force their discontinuance. The
attorney general's ·office has also issued advisory opinions that help
to establish interpretations of consumer protection statutes pending
further interpretations by the courts. For example, the office has
issued an opinion that interprets Michigan's home solicitation sales
act196 in a manner that substantially broadens its scope.197
vivencia del Consumidor de Michigan); "Seek Advice" (Consejo Busque); and "Take
Time" (Tomese Su Tiempo). These pamphlets are distributed to libraries, schools,
local community centers, and local consumer groups. Bladen Interview, supra note 154.
193. Office of the Michigan Attorney General, A Short Course on Consumer Protection Laws of Michigan (rev. ed. 1973).
194. This manual has proved useful to local prosecuting attorneys. Telephone
Interview with John Knapp, Director, Washtenaw County Consumer Action Center,
Washtenaw County Prosecuting Attorney's Office,' Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 11,
1974; Telephone Interview with Paul G. Miller, Chief, Consumer Protection Division,
Genesee County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Flint, Michigan, March _19, 1974.
195.
Guidelines for the Advertisement of Gasoline Prices by Retail Gasoline D«;alers
in Michigan
Pursuant to Michigan's deceptive advertising act, MCLA 445.801 et seq.; MSA
19.853(1} et seq., a retail gasoline dealer's advertisement will be cited as false,
misleading and deceptive if:
·
1) The price indicated on the roadside sign is not· the same J?rice as the price in-·
dicated on the pump.
·
2) The decimal portion of the price, for example, the .9 in a 34.9 cent price, is
not "at least one-half the height and width of the numerals representing the
whole cents." MSA 12.1081(28b).
.
3) The pric~ of all grades of gasoline sold at the station are not advertised, or
alternatively, if the price of only one or tlvo grades are advertised, the fact
that one grade is a sub-regular grade is not clearly and conspicuously shown.
4) The station advertises a "no stamp price" or "minimum service island" and
the conditions for the special price (such as a certain island or pump) are not
clear and conspicuous.
.
.
•
Clear and conspicuous, as stated above, shall mean lettering which is easily readable by a driver from his vehicle, given the speed limits, the number of lanes
on the road, the relative congestion in the area, and the position of the station
with respect to the roadway.
During 1973, approximately 23 cease-and-desist orders were issued· for violations of
these guidelines. All but one of the respondents agreed to halt their deceptive. advertising. That one is now being prosecuted. Bladen Telephone Interview, supra
note l!i6.
196. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§§ 445.111-.117 (Supp. 1973).
197. Letter Opinion from Frank J. Kelley, Michigan Attorney General, to Senator
Jack Faxon, Dec. 7, 1972. The opinion held, inter alia, that the three-day cancellation
provisions of the Act apply to situations in which a seller initiates contact with a
buyer by telephone or a buyer-cons~mer initiates contact with a seller ~nd then
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B. Environmental Protection Activities
Most of the attorney general's activities in the environmental area
are centered in the Environmental Protection and Natural Resources
Division (EPNRD), which has substantial statutory powers. 108 These
powers, along with the attorney general's common law powers, provide the basic framework for an effective environmental protection
program. Again, the existence of adequate legal authority in the
attorney general's office is of less value when the office lacks the
resources needed to utilize that authority.199 As in the consumer area,
the attorney general's office suffers from a lack of resources, but
it still is providing a substantial amount of protection for the
environment.200
The EPNRD's broadest power to protect the environment is
derived from the Environmental Protection Act.201 An example of
the division's recent activity under the Act is Kelley v. National
Gypsum Company. 202 The Air Pollution Control Commission issued
an order setting forth a schedule for the reduction of particulate
emissions from the kilns at defendant's cement factory. 203 The order
enters into a contract with that seller in the buyer's home. Id. at 3-6. This interpre•
tation of the Act has been incorporated into the literature that is distributed by the
division to the public. Bladen Telephone Interview, supra note 156.
198. See text accompanying notes 93-145 supra.
199. An example of the inability of the EPNRD to cope with a substantial portion
of the state's environmental problems can be seen in the area of oil spills. There were
approximately 186 oil spills affecting water in Michigan last year. Michigan Depart•
ment of Natural Resources, Bureau of Water Management, Oil and Hazardous Ma•
terials Control Section, Report to the Water Resources Commission on Oil Loss Con•
trol Activities (1973). The attorney general's office, through the EPNRD, was able to
take action on only two of these spills. The reason for its inability to deal with more
of these spills is basically that the EPRND was unable to obtain the evidence (such
as samples and photographs) needed to bring either civil or criminal actions. Inter•
view with Stewart H. Freeman. Assistant Attorney General, Environmental Protection
and Natural Resources Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michi•
gan, Feb. 8, 1974. If the EPNRD had a sufficient number of investigators to gather
the evidence, legal action could be taken to force compliance with strict precautionary
standards.
200. During the year 1973, the EPNRD received a total of 54 complaints from
nonagency sources. There were 46 complaints from individual citizens, 5 from en•
vironmental groups, and 3 from local government authorities. Action was taken on
all of the complaints. The average time required to take initial action on the individual citizen complaints was ll.4 days. A complaint sent in anonymously by the
Michigan Law Review received initial action in 9 days and was properly investigated.
In addition, the EPNRD carried over approximately 50 active cases from 1972, while
it initiated 17 new cases in 1973.
201. MxcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1973). A study by Professor
Joseph Sax of The University of Michigan shows that, through October I, 1973, the
attorney general has been involved in nine cases on his own initiative under the
Environmental Protection Act. Sax &: DiMento, supra note IOI, manuscript at A-88
(appendix C).
202. No. 1918 (Alpena County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Sept. 25, 1973).
203. In re National Gypsum Co. (Air Pollution Control Commn., Feb. 16, 1971).
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contemplated compliance by April 1977. By late 1972, the Commission staff was convinced that, while the defendant company had met
the order's initial requirements, it would not meet its June 1974
obligation. The case was then forwarded to the EPNRD. Since the
Commission's order had not yet been violated, the EPNRD filed a
complaint alleging violation of the Environmental Protection Act
and, in the alternative, a public nuisance. Because "both parties
hereto believe[d] the interest of the public [could] best be served by
a settlement of this litigation without further proceedings,"204 they
agreed to enter into a consent judgment. The defendant agreed to
comply with a graduated emissions reduction schedule, under which
the Commission's standards would be met by December 1976, three
months earlier than originally scheduled. The court has retained the
case until compliance with the standards is achieved. The division
attained more than the desired result of compliance with Commission standards without expending the resources that litigation would
require.
The National Gypsum case is an example of the EPNRD's use of
the common law power to abate public nuisances. The division's
alternative ground for relief was that the air pollution emanating
from the defendant's plant was of "such a density that it unreasonably interfere[d] with the public health and welfare so as to be a
public nuisance." 205
The EPNRD has also brought actions to recover for damages to
the state's environment and natural resources. For example, in People ex rel. Kelley v. Amoco Production Co.,206 it brought an action
alleging negligence by the defendants in the drilling of oil and gas
wells in Grand Traverse county near Williamsburg, Michigan. In
April 1973, gas blew out of one of the defendants' wells into subsurface permeable geological formations and created a "subsurface blowout well." This gas eventually rose to the surface, where it escaped
into several streams in the area, damaging the state's natural resources.
The damage alleged included a reduction in the fish population of
the streams, pollution of the waters of the streams, and pollution of
the beds of the streams.207 This type of effort to recover for damages
to the state's resources should be part of every action brought to
prevent pollution. 208
204. No. 1918, stipulation at 2.
205. No. 1918, complaint at 4.
206. No. 3461 (Grand Traverse County, Mich., Cir. Ct., filed Aug. 17, 1973). This
case has been removed by the defendants to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan, No. G-217-73CA7, removed Sept. IO, 1973.
207. No. 3461, complaint at 5•6. The attorney general also sought recovery for
damages to state highways and for the costs incurred by the various state agencies and
departments during the emergency period. No. 3461, complaint at 4-5.
208. The attorney general can also bring the action under his common law power
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The EPNRD has also intervened in two major pollution cases
involving the Great Lakes209 and has filed several amicus curiae
briefs in litigation: outside of the state in order to support positions
that would b~nefit Michigan's ·environmental program. One of the
more important cases is Minnesota v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency,210 which involves the issue of whether the federal
executive branch may refuse to spend eleven billion dollars for waste
treatment facilities d~spite a Congressional intent to authorize the
expenditure and despite environmental necessity. Minnesota brought
the action to force the Environmental Protection Agency to spend
the allocated funds, and a district court ordered the expenditure.
The EPNRD filed an amicus curiae brief in support of affirmance by
the United States ·court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the
agency's appeal from the district court decision. 211
The attorney general's office has also become involved in environmental issues raised before the Public Service Commission. By intervening in hearings, the attorney general is at present attempting to
force the Commission to recognize that the Environmental Protecto recover for damage to the lands or property of the state or under the provisions of
the Water Resources Commission Act or the Air Pollution Act if the pollution involves
the violation of one of those uvo Acts. See text accompanying notes 140-41 supra. The
attorney general would then be fulfilling both the goal of cessation of the pollution
and that of restitution to the state.
209. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., No. 5-72 Civ. 19 (D. Minn., Complaint
o~ ,the State of Michigan, Intervening Plaintiff, filed March 10, 1972), where the plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin the defendant's pollution of Lake Superior by the discharge of solid and liquid industrial wastes from its iron ore processing plant in Min•
nesota.
·
The plaintiffs ,and the intervening Michigan Attorney General appear to have
been successful in securing the abatement of the pollution. United States District
Judge Miles Lord told the parties to the action that he will order the defendant to
halt its discharges of taconite wastes containing dangerous asbestos fibers. The judge is
now considering when to order the cut-off. Detroit Free Press, Feb. 27, 1974, at 1-A,
col. 2 (metro ed.). In People ex rel. Scott v. City of Milwaukee, No. 72C-1253 (N.D. Ill.)
(.Motion of the State 'of Michigan for leave to intervene as a party plaintiff, filed
June 29, 1972); the, attorney general intervened, after remand from the United States
Supreme Court, Dlinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), in an action to enjoin the defendant's pollution _of Lake Michigan.
210. No. 73-1446 (8th Cir., docketed July 12, 1973).
211. No. 73-1446 (Brief of the State of Michigan as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Affirmance, filed Sept. 14, 1973). This amicus curiae brief was adopted by the states
of Arkansas, Dlinois, North Dakota, and Wisconsin, pursuant to rule 29 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EPNRD has recently filed another amicus curiae brief with the United States
Supreme Court seeking reversal of the Colorado court of appeals decision in Western
Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., 510 P .2d 907 (1973), which held that
the state's pollution control agencies must secure a search warrant before entering
a pusiness premise to investigate possible violation of pollution control laws. Western
Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., No. 73-690 (Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari). The writ of certiorari was granted, 42 U.S.L,W. 3422
(U.S., Jan. 21, 1974).
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tion Act imposes upon it a duty to consider eQ.vi.ronmental factors. 212
In In re Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.,213
company petition_ed
the Commission for authorization to establish a priority. system for
the rationing of natural gas. Its proposed scheme placed the use of
natural gas for the control of air pollution among the lowest priorities. The attorney general intervened, urging that the use of gas for
pollution control be given a higher priority.214 In opposition to the
Commission's position that it had the authority to consider environmental issues but was not required to do so, the attorney general
maintained that the Environmental Protection Act imposed a duty
on the Commission to consider environmental issues.215 The Commission did not explicitly resolve this issue, but it did assign pollution control a higher priority in the proposed scheme. Subsequent
cases before the Commission indicate that it has begun to consider
environmental issues in making other decisions.216 The Commission
has since asked the legislature for the authority to order public hearings on the environmental effects of proposed electric power lip.es217
and has requested a formal opinion by the attorney general· as to
whether it already has the authority to order such a hearing. 218 The

the

212. The sources of that duty are the Michigan constitution, MICH. CoNST. art 4,
§ 52, and sections 4 and 5 of the Environmental Protection Act. MICH. CoMP. LAws
ANN. §§ 691.1204-.1205 (Supp. 1973). The constitutional provision places an obligation

on the legislature, and derivatively on thG commissions created by the legislature, to
protect the environment. The Environmental Protection · Act lends support to the
argument that the commission has such a duty; section 4(2), MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN.
§ 691.1204(2) (Supp. 1973), grants the courts the authority to remit any action to an
available administrative agency to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct.
The court is to retain jurisdiction of the ~e "pending completion thereof for the
purpose of determining whether adequate protection from pollution, impairment or
destruction has been afforded." By requiring the courts t<;> ensure that the administrative agencies have properly considered environmental issues, the legislature has implicitly recognized an administrative duty to consider environmental factors. In section 5(2) of the Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1205(2) (Supp. 1973), the administrative duty is made more explicit. The agency "shall" determine whether the alleged
pollution is occurring and "shall" not authorize -0r approve ,:J,ny conduct which injures
the environment so long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative.
·
·· ·
213. No. U-3802 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., June 1, 1971).
214. No. U-3802 (Notice of Intervention of Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, filM
Jan. 11, 1971). The attorney general based his intervention on section 5 of the Environmental Protection Act. M.ICH, _Co~P. LA.w~ _ANN. § 691.1205(1) (Supp. 1973). The
Public Service Commission refused to recognize that the attorney general could intervene as a matter of right but did allow the intervention. No. U-3802, transcript at
16-29.
.
· ." ·
215. No. U-3802, transcript at 992.
216. See Michigan Consol. Gas Co., No. U-3933, & Consumers Power Co.~ ·No.
U-3935 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., Oct. 22, 1971) (Pipeline Construction Order), where
the Commission, upon the attorney general's intervention, considered environmental
factors in determining that the duplication of utility pipelines was unnecessary and
reached a mutually acceptable compromise providing for consolidated pipelines that
would reduce the threat of harm to the environment.
-- ,
217. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 21, 1972, at 3=-A, col. 7 (metro ed.).
218. Id: See texf accompanying notes 282-83 infra.
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attorney general's initiative in this area is an excellent example of
how he is using his power to intervene to influence the environmental policies of the state.
As in the case of consumer protection statutes, the attorney general's office has issued advisory opinions interpreting pollution control statutes. For example, in 1970 he issued an opinion that held that
the existing authority of local government units to adopt air pollution control ordinances was not pre-empted by the Air Pollution
Act. 219 The attorney general's office has also expressed its opinion on
environmental issues through other means. For instance, it offered a
position paper in a hearing before the Department of State Highways
concerning the ecological advantages of creating a bicycle transportation network in Michigan.220 The attorney general has also presented
a position paper before the Federal Trade Commission in support
of proposed regulations requiring the disclosure in advertisements of
the phosphorus content of cleaning agents. 221 He has presented a
position paper in support of proposed federal railroad and motor
carrier noise emission standards before the federal Environmental
Protection Agency. 222 The purpose of these nonlitigation activities is
to establish a solid statutory framework within which the office can
provide for effective environmental protection. To the extent that
environmental problems are solved by legislation, the workload of
the attorney general's office and, consequently, the problem of
insufficient funds are somewhat reduced. 223

III.

PROPOSALS FOR .A. MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE

The most efficient use of the attorney general's limited resources
can be achieved if the state's public interest activities are centralized
in his office. Because of his broad powers to enforce the laws and to
influence the approval of new laws and the formulation of state
policy, his office should coordinate activities in the protection of the
public interest on a statewide basis. The National Association of
Attorneys General (NAAG) recommends that each state's attorney
general be given the primary responsibility for enforcing consumer
219. [1969-70] MICH. A1TY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 197.
220. Position Paper of the Attorney General of Michigan, The Development of a
Bicycle Transportation Network in Michigan, March 27, 1973.
221. Position Paper in Support of the Proposed Regulation submitted by the Attor•
ney General of Michigan, The Proposed Regulation Concerning Detergent Labeling and
Advertising, Jan. 2, 1973.
222. ;Position Paper in Support of Noise Pollution Abatement submitted by the
Attorney General of Michigan, Railroad Noise Emission Standards and Motor Carrier
Noise Emission Standards, March 20, 1973 (Environmental Protection Agency Docket
Nos. ONAC 7201001 and ONAC 7202002).
223. Compare the situation in the consumer protection field discussed in the text
accompanying notes 298-99 infra.
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protection laws and for representing the public interest before s~te
regulatory boards and that the attorney general be empowered to· file
any action he deems necessary to protect the public interest.224 The
trend in most states is toward a centralized structure in the attorney
general's office to deal with these problems.225 The attitudes of current and former state attorneys general indicate that a majority of
them feel that their states' consumer protection activities should be
primarily under the attorney general's jurisdiction,226 and in the
recent past, most states, including Michigan, have created state consumer protection and environmental protection sections within the
attorney general's office. 227 Of particular interest is the response of
the Michigan attorney general to an NAAG questionnaire concerning the centralization issue:
The Attorney General is the only state officer with the necessary authority to rapidly and effectively deal with consumer fraud
problems. Only the Attorney General, as this state's chief law
enforcement officer, presents an imminent threat of litigation to
those who choose to engage in deceptive and fraudulent practices.
Since an effective consumer protection program requires constant
legal analysis of various problems and legal decisions regarding possible litigation, said program should clearly be under the direction
of the state's chief law enforcement officer.228
Even though Michigan has a structure conducive to centralized
activity, the actual responsibility is shared between local prosecutors'
offices and the attorney general's office.229 In addition, there is no
centralized reporting system.23° Centralization would facilitate a
coordinated attack on the state's problems and encourage the application of the attorney general's expertise, resources, political power,
224. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 8-9.
225. For a compilation of state attorneys general with assistants regularly assigned
to consumer protection activities, see OFFICE OF ATioRNEY GENERAL, supra note 11,
at 417. For a compilation of offices with assistants assigned to environmental activities,
see Environmental Control Questionnaires, supra note 148, at 3. See also Lovett, supra
note 55, at 735.
226. OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 395. The questionnaire revealed that 31 out of 38 current (1970) attorneys general and 69 out of 108 former
attorneys general felt that consumer protection activities should be centered in the
attorney general's office. But see OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 29,
where those same current (23 out of 38) and former (46 out of 70) attorneys general
felt that their most important function was to represent the state's agencies, a function
that could be inconsistent with representing the public.
227. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRES, supra note 148, at 3; OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 416. Michigan's consumer protection division
was established in 1960, while its environmental protection division was established
in 1972. Styka Interview, supra note 19.
228. OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 415.
229. Styka Interview, supra note 19.
230. See text accompanying notes 244-48 infra.
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a,nd authority: The need for centralized activity is accentuated by
the' difficulties involved in private efforts to provide protection,231
the limitations on local authorities due to inadequate resources and
their need t~ concentrate .on crimes involving physical violence,232
and the apparent ineffectiveness of regulatory action by the state's
administrative agencies.233 In addition, a centralized system will allow
the state's environmental and consumer laws to be consistently
applied; a program that does not give notice to persons contemplating
·illegal activity that the state has a clear intent to pursue violators of
.~e law can never provide adequate protection for the public. A
q~centralized program dissipates already limited resources, making
·coordination difficult~ if not impossible, and inhibiting citizen access
to the authorities empowered to deal with violations because of the
231. Some of the difficulties involved in 'private litigation include the plaintiff's
difficulty in proving that he has standing, whether individually or as a member of a
plaintiff class; the .high costs and expenses involved in private actions in these areas;
and the fact that, when "an individual does decide to exert a legal claim to environ•
mental quality, he may find that he has taken on the legal and economic resources of
an entire industry.''' Jackson, Symposium: Control of Environmental Hazards-Fore•
word: 'Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress, 68 Mrclt. L. REv, 1073,
1076 (1970). See generally Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollu•
tion Through Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126; Comment, Standing To
Sue and Conservation Values, 38 CoLO. L. REv. 391 (1966); Note, State Consumer Pro•
tection: A Proposal, 53 IowA L. REv. 710, 712-16 (1967); Comment, Equity and the
Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1254, 1275-78 (1970); Note,
Citizen Remedies in State Courts, 25 REs !PsA LoQUITUR 52 (1972). But see Mussehl,
The Neighborhood· Consumer Center: Relief for the Consumer at Grass Roots Level,
47 NoTRE DAME LAw. 1093, 1132 (1972) (private remedies should be favored since "no
· effective restitution remedy exists within the sphere of governmental interests.');
Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 11: Considerations of Procedure, 49 Il,U, L.
REv. 407, 479-80 (1969) (despite the traditional restrictive view of standing in class
actions, Michigan courts may be in the midst of a liberalizing trend). See, e.g., Paley
v. Coca Cola Co., 39 Mich. App. 379, 197 N.W.2d 478 (1972), where the court of appeals
declined to follow a recent federal case, Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), and held
that the plaintiffs could aggregate their individual damage claims in order to meet
minimal jurisdiction amount requirements if the action could not othenvise be maintained in the circuit court
232. W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note 1, at 29-30; Saxbe, supra note 3, at 904.
See also Detroit Free Press, Oct. 21, 1973, at 3-A, col. 5 (metro ed.), where it is reported
that the Wayne County prosecutor's office has received 928 complaints of consumer
fraud but _had started only six prosecutions. The reasons given for this inactivity
include lack of resources, unfamiliarity with consumer laws, and fear of local merchants
who might help defeat the local prosecutor at election time. The article also notes that
consumer activities in outstate counties' prosecutors' offices are almost nonexistent.
Local activity for the protection of the consumer does not seem to be likely in the
n,ear future. In fact, the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office recently lost federal funds
to operate its consumer fraud unit. The prosecutor failed to submit a plan that met
'·the.federal requirements.for such programs. Specifically, he lost the 84,000-dollar grant
because he had made no plans for the mediation of complaints and because his con•
sumer education program was inadequate. Detroit Free Press, Dec. 4, 1973, at 3-A,
col. l (metro ed.).
233. See Detroit Free Press, Oct. 1, 1973, at 3-A, col. 2 (metro ed.) (discussing the
ineffectiveness of the Michigan Consumers Council in its activities to protect the consumer); Comment, 68 Mica. L. REv. 1254, supra note 231, at 1259.
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confusing array of agencies. 234 If public interest problems, especially
in the consumer area, are dealt with only at the local level, the
violators may simply move to another part of the state and continue
their activities.230 Action by the attorney general would prevent the
continuation of the activities anywhere within the state. Finally,
centralization allows for easy compilation of reported violations and
complaints. This compilation may enable the attorney general t~
recognize those problems that are of major concern and to warn the
public of the violators' activities. 236
The attorney general also enjoys certain procedural advantages
over both the private citizen and the local prosecutor. First, he has no
problem in establishing his standing to sue since he is authorized to
sue by statute if. the public interest is involved.237 The local prosecutor, in contrast, is limited to attacking problems that involve the
interests of those citizens within his jurisdiction, not those that
involve the interests of the citizens of the state as a whole. Second,
the attorney general can utilize special venue statutes,238 which allow
him to force the defendant to litigate at the state capital, in order to
persuade the violator to agree to a consent judgment or voluntary
assurance of discontinuance.
A policy of centralization is not without its disadvantages. First,
most of the factors discussed above are advantageous only to the
extent that the problem under attack is statewide. A significant number of consumer and environmental problems are local in nature.
If the attorney general had the sole responsibility to deal with local
problems, many of the violations would, because of the need to allocate limited resources, go unattended. Often these smaller violations
most affect the daily life of the public.
One resolution of the dilemma has been a system of concurrent
activity, in which the attorney general and the local prosecutor
divide the responsibility for public protection.239 The attorney general has the authority to deal with any problem that he deems of
sufficient statewide interest. The local prosecutor has the authority
234. Comment, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 926, supra note 1, at 931-32.
235. Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1005, 1124
(1967); Note, State Consumer Protection: A Proposal, 53 lowA L. R.Ev. 710, 718 (1967).
236. Note, supra note 235, at 718.
237. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 14.28, .101 (1967). See People v. O'Hara, 278 Mich.
281, 294, 270 N.W. 298, 303 (1936); Attorney General ex rel. Seitz v. Board of Auditors,
73 Mich. 53, 54-55, 40 N.W. 852, 852 (1888); Attorney General ex rel. Sheley v. City of
Detroit, 55 Mich. 181, 183, 20 N.W. 894, 895-96 (1884); Attorney General ex rel. Cook
v. City of Detroit, 26 Mich. 263, 266-67 (1872); Gremore v. Peoples Community Hosp.
Authority, 8 Mich. App. 56, 59, 153 N.W.2d 377, 378 (1967).
238. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 14.102 (1967); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1631
(1968). See note 112 supra.
239. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Customers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 395, 429-30 (1966).
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to deal with all other problems within his jurisdiction. This concept
is, to some degree, now contemplated by the Michigan statutes, which
give the local prosecutor jurisdiction over his district or county while
allowing the attorney general to initiate or intervene in any action. 240
Second, if centralization is carried out to too great an extent, the
role that each local community's values play in the establishment and
application of the law would be destroyed. 241 The attorney general's
implementation of an effective program of centralization should
allow for locally variant values and conditions. The attorney general's
office is trying to accommodate these considerations in the consumer
protection area by encouraging the establishment of local consumer
protection agencies and boards and by giving advice to local authorities on the prevention and effective prosecution of unfair consumer
practices.242
Third, centralization could increase the attorney general's workload and decrease the substantive level of protection unless additional resources are made available to his office.243 Finally, the centralization of activity in Lansing might inhibit the ability to act quickly
when necessary to preserve the assets of defrauded consumers from
dissipation or to protect the public and the environment from the
irreparable harm of continued pollution. While delay is probably
inevitable in any centralized system, the attorney general can ameliorate the problem by deferring initially to the initiative of local
prosecutors and then reviewing the reports from the prosecutors in
order to select those cases in which he should participate.
Currently, the Consumer Protection Division participates in a
policy coordination council with twelve of the largest counties in
Michigan.244 At the meetings of this council, the attorney general's
representatives and the local prosecuting attorneys discuss their
various problems, and the CPD gives the local prosecutors guidance.
In addition, the attorney general maintains a close working relationship with local prosecuting attorneys throughout the state and gives
them as much help as possible. 245 However, this is not the comprehensive coordination program that is needed.
240. MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 14.28, .101 (1967).
241. Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1080 (1955), where the
author comments that "[t)he desire of a particular community to enforce the Jaws
according to its needs should be respected if this will not be inimical to the interests
of the state."
242. Bladen Interview, supra note 154. But see Detroit Free Press, Oct. 21, 1973, at
3-A, col. 5 (metro ed.), pointing out the ineffectiveness of local consumer activities,
243. Comment, 68 MICH. L. REv. 926, supra note 1, at 971.
244. Telephone Interview with Edwin M. Bladen, Assistant Attorney General, Consumer Protection and Charitable Trusts Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office,
Lansing, Michigan, March 26, 1974. This council is established as a part of the federal
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration program,
245. Id.
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For a year and a half the attorney general operated a computerized system of recording and catagorizing complaints from all law
enforcement agencies in Wayne county.246 This system provided the
CPD with a rapid compilation of the activities within the county
and allowed it to determine when action by the office was warranted.247 The program was discontinued when support from the
federal government ended. The end of the system meant that the
attorney general could no longer choose among the problems.
One limitation on any reporting system is that it aids in discovering problems only to the extent that local prosecutors discern
the existence of those problems.248 Nonetheless, it is important that
the state have the capability to become aware of and attack statewide problems. If sufficient resources could be found, a computerized compilation system should be established for both consumer
and environmental problems.
Once the problems upon which the attorney general should
concentrate have been defined, there are four major ways in which
he should direct his activities in order to meet the twin goals of
prevention and restitution. They are (1) litigation, (2) influencing
state policy, (3) the promotion and support of better legislation,
and (4) the promotion of educational programs designed to inform
the public of its rights and of the channels available to seek redress
of grievances.
Perhaps the major area of the attorney general's activity should
be litigation. This need not always require formal court action.
Effective results can often be obtained by means of a phone call or
a letter to the violator suggesting that the attorney general has information concerning a possible violation and that his office would
like to see the problem corrected. There will, of course, be cases
where an informal approach is inappropriate, either because the
attorney general wants to establish solid legal precedent or set an
example for other potential violators, or because the violator refuses to comply.
When informal methods are unsuccessful and formal litigation
is required, the attorney general must decide whether he should
resort to a criminal action, a civil action, or some combination of the
two. A criminal prosecution has several advantages. First, the threat
of prosecution gives the lower-level manager-for example, a local
plant manager or a local franchisee-a persuasive argument with
246. Id. The program ,vas supported by assistance from the Federal Trade Commi~sion in the form of computer time.
247. Id. For example, the CPD determined, as a result of over 100 complaints against
Time Incorporated, that it should bring an action to force the discontinuance of fraudulent activities. See text accompanying notes 164-66 supra.
248. For a way in which this problem can be ameliorated to some extent, see
notes 304-08 infra and accompanying text.
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which to convince his superiors that the funds necessary for compliance with the law should be made available or th~t _the illegal
activities should be halted. 249 Second, the threat of cnmmal prosecution, especially if that threat is made real by the periodic prosecution of major offenders, can be an effective deterrent. 2G0
However, the in terrorem effects of criminal prosecutions may
be difficult to achieve because of the problems involved in success•
fully prosecuting alleged violators. For example, in order to support
a criminal conviction for unfair consumer practices under the false
advertising statute251 or the false pretenses statute,202 the attorney
general must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intended to deceive or defraud the consumer,253 that the consumer
relied on the defendant's statements,254 and, in the case of false pretenses, that the defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of his
statement and that the false pretense related to an existing fact and
not to some future event. 255 This heavy burden of proof makes the
use of the criminal sanction both difficult and expensive.
Civil remedies have several advantages over criminal remedies.
Procedurally, civil remedies are more easily obtained by the attorney
general: The burden of proof required in a civil action is less than
that required in a criminal action since the attorney general need not
provide each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt;
the pleadings in civil actions are usually simpler; and the scope of
discovery is usually broader than it is in a criminal action. In a
civil action, the attorney general can obtain a default judgment if
249. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 388.
250. An in terrorem effect will result from the use of criminal prosecutions only if
those who are prosecuted under the statutes are actually forced to serve jail sentences,
for a fine will often be treated as a cost of business and passed on to the public. The
attorney general, in order to ensure that the criminal statutes do retain their in terrorem
~ah~e, must be ":iJ!i!1g to punish those viola!o1;1 who continually and willfully engage
m Improper activities. On the value of cr1mmal prosecutions, see generaUy Kove]
A Case for Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control, 46 J. URBAN L, 153 (1969); W, MAO:
NUSON &: J. CARPER, supra note I, at 16-17, 62; Saxbe, supra note 3, at 901-04; Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 235, at 1018, 1122·23; Comment

The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Oflidals for Pollution of the Environment:
37 ALBANY L. REv. 61 (1972); Comment, supra note 239, at 424-27.
·
251. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 750.33 (1968).
252. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.218 (1968) .
. 253. People v. Austin, 3~1 Mich. 456, 460, 3 N.W.2d 841, 842 (1942) (intent to de•
ceive); People v. Lee, 259 Mich. 355, 356, 243 N.W. 227, 228 (1932) (intent to defraud).
254. People v. Lee, 259 Mich. 355,356,243 N.W. 227,228 (1932).
255. People v. Morrison, 348 Mich. 88, 91, 81 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1957) (false pretense
must relate to existing fact); ~eople v. Larco, 331 Mich. 420, 429, 49 N.W.2d 358, 363
(1951) (~ctual knowledge of falsity by defendant). These strict requirements are still part
of Michigan law. See People v. Sharpe, 22 Mich. App. 454, 178 N.W.2d 90 (1970). Another
problem in false advertising cases is that the courts have held that not every misleading
statement is actionable. The courts have made an allowance for the normal "puffing"
of_ a product. See, e.g., People v. Austin, 301 Mich, 456, 460, 3 N.W.2d 841, 842 (1942)
(dictum).
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the defendant fails to appear, whereas he cannot try the defendant
in absentia on a criminal charge. Finally, the attorney general is
allowed to appeal from an adverse civil decision, while an appeal
would not be allowed from an acquittal on a criminal charge.256
A practical advantage of the civil suit is that the possibility of a
favorable jury decision may be greater.Juries are not anxious to impose the stigma of moral blame that accompanies criminal conviction on a polluter or a person engaged in unfair consumer practices.257
A final advantage to the civil approach is that restitutionary
relief is more likely in such actions, for the attorney general can request a return to the status quo ante along with his request for injunctive relief. However, restitution could be made part of a criminal sentence. For example, a suspended sentence could be made
conditional on restitutionary relief.
The problems inherent in the use of a criminal approach should
not totally preclude its use. The attorney general should use a combination of civil and criminal actions, 258 but, because of the procedural advantages and the possibility of restitution, the civil suit
should be favored. Criminal actions should be brought only to the
extent necessary to support and maintain whatever in terrorem
effect they may provide and, if necessary, to punish willful and continued violations.
In addition to deciding how to proceed against an alleged violator, the attorney general must decide whether to go to court at all.
There is no doubt that, like all prosecutorial officials, the attorney
general has broad discretion to decide when and how to take action
in the public interest.259 There are, ho~V'ever, some limits upon that
discretion. He cannot base his decision upon an improper motive
256. Kovel, supra note 250, at 156-58.
257. Id. at 154-56. The author concludes that "(w]e may regret that the moral sense
of the community is not sufficiently developed to consider pollution morally wrong, but
until it is there is little sense" in pursuing criminal remedies. Id. at 155.
258. Id. at 170-71.
259. Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 450, 185 N.W. 877, 880 (1921); Attorney
General ex rel. Linnell v. Gay, 162 Mich. 612, 616, 127 N.W. 814, 816 (1910); Ex rel.
Coon v. Attorney General, 42 Mich. 65, 3 N.W. 258 (1879); People ex rel. Yates v. Attorney General, 41 Mich. 728, 729, 3 N.W. 205, 206 (1879); Gremore v. Peoples Community
Hosp. Authority, 8 Mich. App. 56, 59, 153 N.W.2d 377, 378 (1967). For general discussions of prosecutorial discretion, see F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE
A SusPEcr WITH A Cruz,.m (1970); Dickens, The Attorney-General's Consent to Proser.utions, 35 Mon. L. REv. 347, 357 (1972) C'[a]n undoubted area of the Attorney-General's
unreviewable discretion is in civil relator actions by which he may act at the relation of
any person on behalf of the Crown as parens patriae to enforce the law for the general
public benefit.''); Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective
Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. !LL. L.F. 88; Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 174 (1965); Note, Judicial Control of the Decision To Prose~ute, ~4 FACULTY OF LAw REvmw 133 (1966) (University of Toronto); Note,
Prosecutor's D,scretion, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1955).
_
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such as discrimination on the basis of race or religion. 200 In intervention situations, his discretion is limited by the parties' right to a
prompt disposition of their controversy and the court's power to control the proceedings before it in an orderly fashion. 261 Beyond these
minimal limitations, which only provide for the review of affirmative action undertaken by the attorney general and provide no
method of reviewing an attorney general's decision not to take
action, his discretion is unlimited. Mandamus will not lie, because
his prosecutorial duty is not ministerial.262 The courts have recited
a general rule that the attorney general's discretion is subject to
judicial review if it is "clearly inimical" to the public interest,263 but,
as a practical matter, there is no real supervision. This will be important when no action is taken on a complaint brought by a citizen
to the attorney general's office. Beyond political pressure, the decision not to act is not reviewable. 264
The existence of this broad discretionary power presents the
issue of whether effective protection of the public interest might not
be better served if the attorney general were to establish a set of
guidelines on when action should be taken. On the national level
the American Bar Association has attempted to establish guidelines
for criminal prosecutions, in order to facilitate and, to some extent,
control prosecutorial discretion. 265 The Michigan attorney general
260. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc.
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Il8 U.S. 356 (1886); United
States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1149, I151 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d
256, 263-64, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2ll, 215-16 (1967). See also United States v. Falk, 479 F,2d
616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973), where the court said that discriminatory prosecution "on the
basis of the exercise of protected First Amendment activities" is forbidden "just as discrimination on the basis of religion or race is forbidden by the Constitution."
261. Gremore v. Peoples Community Hosp. Authority, 8 Mich. App. 56, 59, 153
N.W.2d 377, 378 (1967). On the issue of the court's power to control the proceedings
before it, see Hain v. Newell, 223 Mich. 20, 27-28, 193 N.W. 839, 842 (1923): "All courts
of general jurisdiction have inherent power to make and protect relevant interlocutory
orders and to do all incidental things which seem reasonably necessary for the administration of justice and efficient exercise of their functions within the scope of their jurisdiction."
262. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
263. People v. Johnston, 326 Mich. 213,217, 40 N.W.2d 124, 126 (1949).
264. Attorney General ex rel. Linnell v. Gay, 162 Mich. 612, 616, 127 N.W. 814, 816
(1910): "We do not mean to imply that there is any obligation upon the attorney general under this action to file an information when, in his judgment, there are proper
reasons of policy for not doing it, or any obstacle to a refusal to do so when solicited
by private persons in the furtherance of their own interests, provided State interests do
not require it." But see Lamoreaux v. Attorney General, 89 Mich. 146, 150-51, 50 N.W.
812, 813 (1891), where the court said that it would review the refusal of the attorney
general to institute a quo warranto action against a city sheriff because it feared that,
where the attorney general and the sheriff were of the same political party, the attorney
general's refusal may be based on improper motives.
265. See, e.g., ABA PROJEcr ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROSECUTION FUNcrION AND THE DEFENSE FUNcrION standards 3.8-3.9 (1971) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. The ABA also recommends that each "prosecutor's office should
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has no such formal guidelines in the consumer and environmental
areas. 266 Guidelines would assure that resources were directed toward the problems that most need attention. A set of guidelines,
however, can be no more than just that. The facts of each situation
vary to such an extent that any set of guidelines should allow for
flexibility of action; their ultimate value lies in their use as recommendations.
Several basic factors should go into any decision of when to take
action. The attorney general must first decide if the violation is of
such a nature as to warrant action by any prosecutorial officer and
then decide if the violation warrants action by his office in particular. Recommended considerations include the nature, extent, and
scope of the harm caused, the financial situation of the affected citizen, the possibility of successful litigation, speed of disposition, the
degree of willfulness involved, the importance of the case in the
attorney general's general scheme to provide statewide consumer or
environmental protection, and the relative importance of a successful resolution of this particular case in comparison to the actions
that will not be handled if resources are allocated to it. The attorney
general should give no weight to personal or political advantages
that might be involved in a particular case,267 but it is inevitable
that such considerations will occasionally be a factor. 268 To the extent that a decision is immune from such considerations, however,
the establishment of guidelines will help the office fulfill its obligation to protect the public interest.
In addition to the lack of prelitigation guidelines, the Michigan
attorney general has no system of periodic checks to determine
whether the requirements of voluntary agreements or judicial judgments are being complied with. 269 Particularly when voluntary
develop a statement of (i) general policies to guide the exercise of prosccutorial discretion and (ii) procedures of the office.'' Id., standard 2.5. Cf. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
A'ITORNEYS GENERAL, MODEL MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR A'ITORNEYS GENERALS' OFFICES (1972). Twelve states' attorney general's offices have or arc preparing procedures manuals in the area of consumer protection. State Programs, supra note 148, at
32-33.
266. Telephone interview -with Ronald J. Styka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General,
Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, March 12, 1974.
267. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 265, standard 3.9(c).
268. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 235, at 1133
("[T]he strong political aura which inevitably surrounds an elected attorney general
encourages an overemphasis on consumer refunds and may occasionally discourage
action against the questionable practices of 'respectable' businessmen.''); Comment,
Public and Private Consumer Remedies in New York, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 326,329 (1970).
However, "[p]olitical sensitivity can work both ways •.• and the consumer's complaint
might have some publicity value." Mussehl, supra note 231, at 1132. See also Comment,
70 MICH. L. REv. 1367, supra note I, at 1374 n.44.
269. Bladen Telephone Interview, supra note 156; Telephone Interview with Stewart
H. Freeman, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental Protection and Natural Re-

1078

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:1030

methods are used, the'attorney general must carefully check for compliance: Without such a system, the tool of voluntary agreement is
ineffective. There is no such system because there are not enough
resources tp provide for even the initial enforcement of the law,
much less for follow-up enforcement.270 In the environmental area,
part of the responsibility for such a program can be placed on the
administrative agencies, but the EPNRD must persuade the agencies to allocate a sufficient amount of their resources to fund the
compliance program. Whether by securing more funds from the
legislature or by convincing the agencies to establish compliance
programs, the attorney general must ensure that an effective system
is established.
The second method used by the attorney general should be the
exercise of influence on the formulation of state policy. The recognition that the attorney general is more than just the governor's
attorney suggests that he should have, and does have, a role to play
in state policy formulation. 271 Because there may be doubt under
some of .the statutes establishing administrative agencies as to
whether the attorney general must wait for agency referral before
he can act, he must ensure that the state's policies are such that he
need not always exercise initiative power. There are several ways in
which the attorney general can seek to establish administrative policies that, in ~emselves, properly protect the public interest.
First, he cah influence the policies of state agencies by issuing
advisory opinions.272 The attorney general currently issues three
types of advisory opinions: informal opinions to agency and departmerit heads, letter opinions, and formal opinions.273 While many
sources Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, March 13, 1974
(hereinafter Freeman Telephone Interview].
270. Id.
271. See B.

ABERNETHY, SO!\IE PERSISTING QUESTIONS CONCERNING TIIE CONSTITUTIONAL

STATE ExEcunVE 38 (1960), where the author, in commenting upon the results of a ques•
tionnaire sent to governors and attorneys general c:;oncerning the position of the attorney
general in state government, concludes that
[a] thin and not too easily defined thread of thought runs through all their com•
ments, which seems to say that this is not solely a ministerial post; that its rcsponsi•
bilities go beyond and embrace something of the judicial and perhaps even of the
representative; that the attorney general is not solely the governor's attorney, or
even sol[e]ly his administration's attorney, but is rather the people's and the state's
attorney, responsible to maintain and protect the interests and rights of the people
and of the state as against the governor and his administration, as well as to serve
state officials ••• and that here is an institution about which hangs an aura of the
ancient and of the common law, as well as constitutional statutory law, which marks
it for special status and stature in the state governmental structure.
But cf. note 226 supra.
272. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 14.32 (1967). See generally Larson, The Importance
and Value of Attorney General Opinions, 41 IowA L. REv. 351 (1956); Scott, The Role
of the Attorney General's Opinions in Illinois, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 643 (1972); To~pfer,
Some Legal Aspects of the Duty of the Attorney General To Advise, 19 U. CIN, L. REV.
201 (1950).
273. Styka Interview, supra note 19.

.
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jurisdictions hold that formal opinions are not binding on state
agencies,274 in Michigan formal advisory opinions, while not binding on the courts,275 do bind state agencies.276
Even if the Michigan courts were to hold that no opinions are
binding on state agencies, an opinion by the attorney general would,
in all probability, still be followed. 277 The agency's desire to do
what the law requires motivates its request for the opinion, and a
well-reasoned and well-researched opinion will most likely be followed.278 Also, the agencies wish to be protected. by the attorney
general's opinion. While this.protection is debatable from a legal
point of view,279 action supported by an opinion will at least be
likely to protect the agency from public criticism. Moreover, the
agency will probably follow the opinion simply because it is the
agency's only source of legal advice. Finally, state officials may follow the attorney general's opinion because they feel that the state
courts will consider the opinion to be highly persuasive authority. 280
The Michigan attorney general's issuance of advisory opinions has
been limited in the recent past, but efforts are currently being made
to increase activity in this respect.281
The present system has one major defect. The time delay between the request for an opinion and its issuance is, in ·some cases,
unreasonably long. For example, in 1972, the Michigan Public Service Commission requested an opinion as to whether it had the
authority to order public hearings on the environmental effects of
proposed electric power lines.282 The opinion has_ not yet been is274. Christenson, supra note 3, at 326; Larson, supra note 272, at 360-61.
275. Fowler v. Kavanagh, 63 F. Supp. 167, 168-69 (E.D. Mich. 1944), revd. on other
grounds, 146 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1945); David Walcott Kendall Memorial School v. City
of Grand Rapids, 11 Mich. App. 231,237, 160 N.W.2d 778,781 (1968).
276. Traverse City School Dist. v. Attorney General, 384 Mich. 390, 410 n.2, 185
N.W.2d 9, 17 n.2 (1971). See also [1950-1952] MICH. ATIY. GEN. BmNNIAL REP. 54, 55.
277. Abraham &: Benedetti, The State Attorney General: A Friend of the Court?,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 799-800 (1969); Christenson, supra note 3, at 326-27; Larson,
supra note 272, at 361; Scott, supra note 272, at 653.
278. Christenson, supra note 3, at 326.
279. Christenson, supra note 3, at 327; Larson, supra note 272, at 363; Toepfer,
supra note 272, at 216-17. If a state official follows an attorney general's opinion, he will
most likely have a good faith defense to any action brought against him. See State ex rel.
Smith v. Leonard, 192 Ark. 834, 839-40, 95 S.W.2d 86, 88-89 (1936); State ex rel. Johnson
v. Baker, 74 N.D. 244,277, 21 N.W.2d 355,372 (1~4~).
280. David Walcott Kendall Memorial Schopl-v. City of Grand Rapids, 11 Mich. App.
231,237, 160 N.W.2d 778, 781 (1968). See also Fowler v. Kavanagh, 63 F. Supp. 167, 16869 (E.D. Mich. 1944), revd. an other grounds, 146 F,2d 961 (6th Cir. 1945).
281. Styka Interview, supra note 19. For example, in 1973, the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the EPNRD estimated that his division issued 6 formal opinions
and 160 letter opinions. During a one-week sample period, his division handled 96
informal opinions. Freeman Telephone Interview, supra note 269.
282. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 21, 1972, at 3-A, col. 7 (metro ed.). See text accompanying note 218 supra.
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sued. The opinion request received a quick response at the division
level, but its controversial nature led to its delay by the five-man
board that reviews all proposed formal opinions.283 While the attorney general must ensure that each formal opinion is correct with
respect to both law and policy, some care must also be taken to
ensure that the process of review does not destroy whatever value a
proper opinion may have. The attorney general should see that
opinion requests proceed expeditiously through his office and that
the opinions are issued while they will still be of use to the agency
that requested them. The establishment of formal time limits on
each step of the issuing process might be helpful.
A program of advisory opinions aimed at ensuring that the policies of the state's administrative agencies are consonant with the protection of the public interest might be challenged on the ground
that it constitutes unwarranted interference with the agencies' legislative mandate to deal with consumer and environmental problems.
While excessive use of opinions might be justifiably criticized on
this ground, the reasonable exercise of the opinion power can withstand such a challenge. The attorney general has also been given
a legislative mandate to provide for consumer and environmental
protection. It is within his authority to use all his powers to see that
such protection is provided.
There is one limiting factor on the opinion power of the attorney general. He may issue an advisory opinion only upon a request
from the governor, the legislature, or any state officer.284 While this
statutory requirement may theoretically limit his power, the prospects of securing a request for an opinion on a particular issue are
probably good. 285 If the attorney general can secure the necessary
request, his advisory opinion power is an effective way through
which to influence and help formulate state policy.
A second method that the attorney general can employ to influence state policy at the administrative level is given to him by the
Michigan Administrative Procedures Act. 286 Section 45 287 of the Act
provides that the approval and adoption of any agency rule or standard is conditioned upon the attorney general's determination that
it is legal. His determination under this section need not stop
at the point where he decides that the proposed regulations are not
unconstitutional or in conflict with a statute, as it presently does. 288
283. Interview with Roderick S. Coy, Assistant Attorney General, Special Litigation
Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, Feb. 8, 1974.
284. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 14.32 (1967).
285. Freeman Telephone Interview, supra note 269.
286. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 24.201-.315 (Supp. 1973).
287. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 24.245(1) (Supp. 1973).
288. Freeman Telephone Interview, supra note 269. In some instances, it may be
impractical for the attorney general's office to give substantive review to policy consid•
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The attorney general has the right to require that the proposed regulations be in accordance with the legislature's desire to provide for
consumer and environmental protection. The effectiveness of this
power, however, is dependent on the initial adoption of rules by the
agencies since the attorney general can only comment on proposed
regulations.
If the attempts of the attorney general to influence state policies
by using advisory opinions or through the review of proposed regulations do not succeed, he can still influence agency policies by refusing to represent the agencies in particular litigation, because he
is their exclusive legal representative. 289 While the office has not
done this recently, 290 it could in the future refuse to initiate an action requested by the agency or refuse to defend the agency in an
action brought against it.
This approach can be criticized as a violation of the duty, imposed upon the attorney general by the legislature, to represent
state agencies. 291 It can be argued that, if the attorney general is to
maintain the position that he has the exclusive power to represent
state agencies, he must provide that representation at all times. The
legislature may not have intended to give the attorney general such
power over state agencies. He has, however, been given clear instructions to protect the public interest in consumer and environmental areas. It can be inferred from this that he should utilize all
powers available to protect the public interest and that one of these
powers is to decide whether his representation of an agency would be
detrimental to the public interest. There is some support for this
principle at the federal level.292 In addition, the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility provides that an attorney may "exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to
assert a right or position of his client." 293 If the attorney general
erations in a proposed rule or standard. For example, when a regulation concerning
the amount of pollutants that should be allowed to be discharged is involved, it may be
difficult for the EPNRD to challenge the agency's decision since the agency will have
conducted hearings on the matter.
289. Styka Interview, supra note 19; Christenson, supra note 3, at 311-15.
290. Styka Interview, supra note 19.
291. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 14.29 (1967).
292. H. CUMMINGS & C. McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 510 (1937), quoting FTC v.
Claire Co., 274 U.S. 160, 174 (1927):
The Attorney General and the officers of the Department of Justice are charged
with no such simple duty as requires merely interpretation, prosecution, or defense
at the behest of public administrators. In the words of the Supreme Court, they
have the duty-not merely the power-of examining the "scope and propriety" of
administrative action and of "sifting out" that which is pertinent and lawful before
asking the courts to adjudge. Moreover, says the nation's highest tribunal, the wide
scope and variety of these questions "show the wisdom of requiring the chief law
officer of the Government to exercise a sound discretion."
See also Christenson, supra note 3, at 314.
293. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL R.EsPONSIBUITY DR 7-IOl(B)(l) (1970). These dis-
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determines that the public interest would be harmed, he has not
only the right but the duty to refuse to handle the case.204
A third area of attorney general activity should be the initiation
and promotion of legislation: The most obvious need for effort in
this regard is in the support of legislation that would increase the
resources available to the attorney general's office. The office cannot now seek out cases because of the shortage of personnel2M and
must, on occasion, fail to take action on problems of which it is
aware.296 As one of the agencies charged with the enforcement of the
law, the attorney general's office should accept some of the responsibility for securing appropriate funds for itself and for other
agencies.297
ciplinary rules were adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in 1971. 885 Mich, lvi
(1971). See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsl'ONSIBILITY DR 7-10l(B)(2) (1970)
(A lawyer may "[r]efuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful,
even though there is some support for an argument that the conduct is legal.'):
Christenson, supra note 3, at 818-14.
294. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE.sPoNSIBlllTY EC 7-14 (1970): "A government
lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain from instituting
or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair.'' An interesting question arises as to
whether the attorney general should authorize the state agency to secure outside counsel
to handle the case. While this would lessen the impact of his refusal to represent the
agency, the attorney general should allow the agency to secure the outside counsel for
the purposes of the one case and then intervene on the other side to oppose the agency's
position. See ABA CODE OF PRoFESSioNL REsPoNSmILITY DR 2-110(A)(2) (1970): "[A] lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid
foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and
property to which the client is entitled ••• .''
295. Bladen Interview, supra note 154; Freeman Interview, supra note 199.
296. See note 199 supra.
297. The attorney general's efforts to secure additional funds has met with little
success in the past. For example, the following table shows the results of his efforts to
obtain more assistant attorneys general:
NONCLERICAL POSITIONS

Consumer,
Protection•
Total New

Licensing 8:
Regulation
Total New

Environmental
Protection
Total New

1972-78
Requested
8
6
14
2
2
8
Governor Recommended
6
0
5
1
8
2
Final Appropriation
6
0
1
5
9
3
1978-74
2 ..
Requested
6
7
2
12
3
Governor Recommended
6
0
5
0
9
0
Final Appropriation
6
0
,6
1
9
0
1974-75
Requested
10
4
II
5••·
9
0
Governor Recommended
6
0
6
0
9
0
•Includes both attorney and investigator positions.
..Supplemental request made on March 6, 1978, after initial Budget Request.
•• •Includes 3 attorneys to act as drug diversion task force.
Letter from Ronald J. Styka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Michigan Attorney
General's Office, to Michigan Law Review, March 27, 1974.

April 1974]

Notes

1083

The attorney general should also initiate and support particular
pieces of legislation that would provide better substantive law in the
consumer protection area, where the attorney general's activities are
now limited because of the lack of a comprehensive consumer protection act. While the office has been supporting the passage of such
a bill for the past several years,298 the political climate in the legislature, among other things, has prevented its passage.299 Because of the
limited resources available to the attorney general, his present activities are episodic in nature. No comprehensive attack on consumer
and environmental problems can be sustained without the proper
legislative support. Thus, the legislature and the public are more to
blame than the attorney general. In any case, the attorney general
should allocate a portion of the resources available to him toward
securing the approval of needed funds and legislation. In the immediate future a substantial investment of resources into a program
of legislative lobbying, even to the point of employing a lobbyist,
could result in the establishment of a solid foundation for effective
consumer and environmental protection.
The final area of activity for the attorney general should be education;300 no program of consumer or environmental protection
can be effective without an aware public.301 Through education,
the attorney general can provide for the protection of the public
interest in the most efficient way possible.
An educated public will help the attorney general's program of
protection in other ways. In a law enforcement system that, because
of its limited resources, must rely upon public complaints, the public must have the capacity both to recognize problems and to report
those problems to the proper law enforcement. agency. Therefore,
the education programs must be aimed not only at informing the
public of its rights but also at informing it of how it should seek
redress of violations of those rights.302
298. Bladen Interview, supra note 154. The attorney general's office did play a
major role in the initiation and passage of the Land Sales Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 565.801-.835 (Supp. 1973), and the Home Sales Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 445.111-.117 (Supp. 1973). Styka Interview, supra note 19.
299. The Michigan House of Representatives passed a new act to protect consumers,
Mich. H.B. 4001, by a 71 to 35 margin. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 31, 1974, at 3-A, col. 6
(3-star ed.). However, the bill faces an uncertain fate in the Michigan Senate. See
Detroit Free Press, Feb. 2, 1974, at 3-A, col. 4 (metro ed.) (description of successful
efforts by the Senate Republicans to assign the bill to the conservative Senate Judiciary
Committee, which killed such a bill two years ago).
300. For discussion of the role education should play in an attorney general's program, see OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GENERAL, supra note 11, at 421-22; Burch, supra note 3,
at 163-64; O'Connell, supra note 3, at 236-37; Saxbe, supra note 3, at 906-08.
301. See Note, supra note 49, at 1479, which showed that the level of public knowledge of consumer law is low: "Few, if any, of the factors studied-general education
level, income, newspaper readership, consumer experience--had a strong correlation
with knowledge of consumer rights."'
302. A survey of public interest groups, which should be among the best informed
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An education program may help the protection effort in two
other ways. First, if the public has an increased awareness and knowledge of consumer and environmental problems, it will be more
likely to pressure the legislature to approve the proper substantive
legislation and to allocate the necessary funds. Second, increased
knowledge and awareness of problems may result in increased private litigation, which may in turn lead to an increased receptivity
on the part of courts to environmental and consumer problems. 303
In addition, private litigation of these problems would decrease tl1e
workload of the attorney general's office, again allowing it to reallocate some of its resources to other activities. As previously mentioned, the Michigan attorney general's office is involved in some
public education programs. These programs are sound as far as they
go, but more are needed. The attorney general should develop a full
program under the supervision of a consumer education specialist.
Perhaps the two most promising avenues are public relations work
in the media and intensive programs for school children.
Activities in the four areas discussed above-litigation, policy
making, legislation, and education-should result in an effective
program of consumer and environmental protection. One final suggestion encompasses all four areas. The attorney general's office
should, to the greatest extent possible given its limited resources,
shift from its present reliance on citizen complaints and agency
referrals to a program involving affirmative action by the attorney
general. Reliance on citizen complaints is an effective method of
dealing with the problems only to the extent that the complaints received by the office represent a comprehensive cross section of the
problems within the state. 304 Lower-income persons are distrustful
of the law to the point that they are reluctant to rely on the law and
its officials to seek redress of their rights: 305 "The poor cannot
groups of citizens, indicates that more than half of those groups responding do not rely
upon the attorney general's office. The response letters are on file with the Michigan
Law Review.
303. For an example of a judicial response to a need of the public to secure relief,
see Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 980 (1957), where the author describes the history of equity's recognition of a
need for derivative suits and tl1e subsequent evolution of mechanisms to allow them.
The author concluded "that the origin of tlie derivative suit, as indeed of any nonstatutory type of action, lies in judicial recognition of a new wrong or maladjustment
for which pre-existing legal procedure proved more or less inadequate." Id. at 992,
304. Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 235, at 1126, A
system that basically relies on consumer complaints requires a knowledgeable public
tliat is willing to report violations of tlie law. However, a recent study has shown,
"tlie level of citizen knowledge of criminal law is fairly high and tliat of consumer
law is fairly low." Note, supra note 49, at 1479. With this low level of citizen knowl•
edge of consumer law, the Michigan attorney general cannot expect real results unless
a massive increase in public knowledge is brought about tlirough public education
programs or unless tlie office shifts to an initiative approach.
305. W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note l, at 8-9, 54. The reasons for this re•
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conceive of getting justice from a law which has so viciously exploited them in the past."306 However, it is often these lower-income
persons who bear the brunt of harmful activities, especially unfair
and deceptive consumer practices. The attorney general should establish a monitoring system that reviews possible areas of violations,
such as media advertisements.307
luctance to rely upon governmental officials can be seen in the remarks of former
United States Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. In a speech before the National
Conference of Law and Poverty in 1965, Mr. Katzenbach commented:
More damaging, poverty breeds crime indirectly, because it breeds isolation
from society and fundamental resentment against its laws and those who enforce
them...•
Too often, the poor man sees the law only as something that garnishees his
salary; that repossesses his refrigerator; that evicts him from his house; that cancels his welfare; that binds him to usury; or that deprives him of his liberty because he cannot afford bail ....
. . . The poor man has little reason really to believe [the law] is his guardian;
he has every reason to believe it is an instrument of the other society, of the
well-off, the well-educated, the well-dressed, and the well-connected. The poor man
is cut off from this society-and from the protection of its laws ....
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW & POVERTY, PROCEEDINGS 63 (1965). As noted, the recent
study of Michigan citizens' legal knowledge did not show any positive correlation
between education and consumer knowledge, Note, supra note 49, at 1471, or between
higher incomes and consumer knowledge. Note, supra, at 1472. If these conclusions are
valid, the problems inherent in a system that relies on complaints will probably arise
throughout the state but will be most severe in the lower-income areas where the
public shows less willingness to report illegal activities to law enforcement agencies.
One possible method of increasing the representativeness of the complaints that
reach the attorney general's office is to establish "field offices" throughout the state,
especially in Detroit. These offices would encourage complaints in areas that normally
do not report complaints by providing easily accessible opportunities to report. The
Complaint Examiner in the Michigan Attorney General's office favors the establishment of such field offices in order to provide the inner-city citizen with an opportunity
to complain and receive help. She estimates that only about 15 per cent of the consumer complaints received by the attorney general's office are from the City of Detroit.
Wright Interview, supra note 155. See Burch, supra note 3, at 162 (describing Maryland's "storefront office" program). But see Saxbe, supra note 3, at 898 (establishment
of field offices may cause a separation of already limited resources available to an attorney general's office and lead to concentration on local problems while concern
with long-range problems is diminished).
The problem of shortages of funds can be partially offset by using federal funds
that are available for the operation of local offices. For example, the Missouri Attorney
General operates a federally funded consumer protection office in St. Louis. Letter
from Harvey Tettlebaum, Chief Counsel, Consumer Protection Division, Missouri
Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, Missouri, to the Michigan Law Review, Sept.
20, 1973. Other states operating branch consumer protection offices include Alabama
(I), Alaska (3), Arizona (1), California (14), Florida (3), Idaho (2), Illinois (20), Indiana
(1), Louisiana (3), Maryland (2), Missouri (3), New Jersey (I), New York (7), Pennsylvania (7), Texas (5), and Wisconsin (2). State Programs, supra note 148, at 6-7. The
risk of overconcentration on local problems can be overcome by a system of tracing
and recording complaints in order to discern statewide problems. See generally Note,
Consumer Protection by the State Attorney General: A Time for Renewal, 49 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 410, 423-27 (1973).
306. w. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note 1, at 54.
307. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1, at 105-36; w. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note l;
Comment, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 926, supra note I, at 926-27.
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Reliance on agency referrals is likewise effective only to the extent that the agencies themselves receive complaints about a com•
prehensive cross section of the problems within the state, the agencies are adequately staffed and budgeted, and the agencies remain im~
mune from political pressures. In order to discern the problems affecting less vocal groups, the attorney general must inform himself
of the activities occurring in, for example, the inner city in Detroit.
This can be done by establishing field offices.808 The establishment
of an affirmative program would allow the attorney general to provide more effectively for consumer and environmental protection
throughout the state.
IV. FINDINGS AND R.EcoMMENDATJONS
The Michigan attorney general's office is taking an active role
in both the consumer and environmental protection areas, and in
many ways the office should be a model for other states' attorneys
general. However, significant improvements can be made by both
the legislature and the attorney general himself: (1) While the attorney general's office is properly structured for protection of the
public interest,309 it is insufficiently funded. 310 Both consumer protection activities311 and environmental protection activities812 are
limited by inadequate resources. (2) While Michigan statutes provide a measure of protection for the consumer, 818 the lack of a comprehensive consumer protection bill severely hinders the attorney
general's efforts. 314 As the state legislature has been unwilling to pass
such an act the attorney general's office should allocate the resources necessary to secure passage of a comprehensive bill.816 The
attorney general does have adequate substantive power to protect
the environment.316 (3) The attorney general should establish a
system under which the activities of the state's governmental units
are centralized in the attorney general's office, but where the local
units will still be able to act, in order to provide maximum protection for Michigan citizens.817 The office presently lacks a formal
system for the receiving, recording, and reviewing of reports from
local prosecutorial officers.318 (4) The attorney general is forced, be308.
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See note 305 supra.
See text accompanying note 146 supra.
See text accompanying notes 147-49 supra.
See note 155 supra; text accompanying notes 183-86 supra.
See note 199 supra.
See text accompanying notes 42-88 supra.
See text accompanying note 55 supra.
See text accompanying notes 295-99 supra.
See text accompanying notes 89-145 supra.
See text accompanying notes 224-48 supra.
See text accompanying notes 244-48 supra.
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cause of inadequate resources, to rely on complaints and agency referrals. This reliance inhibits the attorney general's ability to recognize or discover the more serious problems. 1 9 To remedy this problem, the attorney general should establish a monitoring system 20
and should allocate the resources necessary to establish field offices
in Detroit and other population centers. 82 1 In addition, an intensive
public education program should be established.3 22 (5) In the area of
litigation, formal guidelines should be established to facilitate the
exercise of the attorney general's discretion.3 23 In addition, civil
actions should be favored over criminal actions.324 There is a serious
postlitigation problem in that the attorney general lacks sufficient
resources to operate a compliance check system.3 25 (6) The attorney
general should increase the use of his powers to formulate and influence state policy.3 28 His use of advisory opinions to influence the
policy of the state should be expanded,3 2 7 and care should be taken
2
to ensure that requests for opinions are expeditiously handled.

The attorney general should begin to use his power to review proposed administrative regulations with regard to substantive policy.3 29
ie should begin cautiously to use his power to refuse to represent
agencies and boards, in order to influence state policy. 330

